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THE HUMAN RIGHTS JUSTIFICATION FOR CONSENT 
VIJAY M. PADMANABHAN* 
ABSTRACT 
Human rights actors have advocated and implemented 
changes in how international human rights law is made and 
interpreted to reduce a State’s control over the content of its human 
rights obligations.  Such efforts are premised on the view that State 
consent is an impediment to development of human rights.  This 
article argues, however, that State consent is essential to the 
protection of the human right of self-determination, a right which 
guarantees people collective control over their political, economic, 
social, and cultural development.  Thus, efforts to expand 
international human rights without State consent are in tension 
with human rights. 
Because consent is essential to protecting the right to self-
determination, efforts to limit State consent must be undertaken 
consistently with the traditional methodology for adjudicating 
rights competitions:  proportionality analysis.  Proportionality 
requires that limitations upon self-determination be based upon a 
human rights rationale that is proportionate to the restriction in 
question.  Advocates for diminishing the role of State consent in 
human rights lawmaking have not conducted this analysis. 
Proportionality analysis reveals the need to develop additional 
human rights rationales to support restrictions on self-
determination.  It also reveals the need to modulate restrictions on 
self-determination to better match the rationales proffered. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
“The international human rights program is more than a 
piecemeal addition to the traditional corpus of international law 
. . . . By shifting the fulcrum of the system from the protection of 
sovereigns to the protection of people, it works qualitative changes 
in virtually every component.”1  Michael Reisman’s prophetic 
words from 1990 foreshadowed a continuing struggle within 
international law generally, and human rights law specifically, to 
adapt international law developed during an age of States’ rights 
to a system ever-more organized around the protection of human 
rights. 
One area where this struggle has been ongoing has been with 
respect to the mechanisms by which international human rights 
obligations are created.  It is axiomatic to describe the international 
legal system as voluntary:  a State is bound only by those 
international legal obligations to which it consents.2  This statement 
is an oversimplification of even traditional doctrine, which has 
recognized that customary norms bind unaware or objecting 
States.3  But State consent is the primary grounds for international 
legal obligation. 
A primarily voluntary legal system has traditionally been 
justified as an attribute of State sovereignty; consent ensures that 
State autonomy is limited only if the State agrees.4  But a voluntary 
legal system has drawbacks if the goal is protection of human 
rights as opposed to States’ rights.  An international human rights 
regulatory system developed through consent is riddled with 
geographic gaps, is normatively thin, and evolves slowly given the 
encumbrances of consent-based lawmaking.5  It also gives States 
                                                     
1 W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary 
International Law, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 866, 872 (1990). 
2 See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7) (“The 
rules of law binding upon States . . . emanate from their own free will . . . .  
Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed.”). 
3 See infra notes 31–33 and accompanying text (describing difficulty in 
reconciling peremptory norms and the obligations of newly created States with 
the consent principle). 
4 See John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated 
Concept, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 782, 782 (2003) (linking sovereignty to consent as the 
foundation of international law). 
5 See infra Section 2.1 (providing human rights criticisms of the consent 
principle). 
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complete control over the development of human rights 
obligations, which is in tension with the reality that States are the 
primary violators of human rights and undermines the global 
cosmopolitan ethos.6  Scholars, international institutions, and 
human rights activists have been consequently critical of the 
voluntary international legal system.7 
To ameliorate these concerns, many international legal actors 
have advocated for the diminishment of the consent principle.  The 
International Court of Justice has promulgated a rule easing the 
formation of custom in the face of contrary practice.8  Scholars and 
activists have advocated for an ever-growing list of jus cogens 
norms from which persistent objection is not permitted.9 
In treaty law, institutions involved in interpreting human 
rights treaties employ a teleological approach to interpretation that 
can result in locating obligations not agreed to by the parties.10  The 
Human Rights Committee (HRC), a treaty monitoring body (TMB) 
created by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), has claimed the right to sever invalid reservations and 
hold States responsible for the original treaty provision, without 
subsequent opportunity for the State to exit the treaty.11 
All of these efforts are premised on the belief that reducing the 
domain for State consent is a normative positive for a system 
oriented around protection of human rights.  But this analysis 
suffers from an important flaw:  it treats consent solely as a 
                                                     
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 186 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua Case] (announcing that 
contrary practice would be treated as confirming the existence of custom if 
defended consistently with a putative rule). 
9 See Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 291, 292 (2006) (detailing efforts to expand the category of jus cogens norms with 
little or no evidence of general acceptance by the international community as 
such). 
10 See infra notes 97–116 and accompanying text (describing uses of this 
approach by human rights adjudicatory bodies). 
11 See U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 24 (52): General 
Comment on Issues Relating to Reservations Made Upon Ratification or 
Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols Thereto, or in Relation to 
Declarations Under Article 41 of the Covenant, 52d Sess., Nov. 2, 1994, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (Nov. 11, 1994) (claiming the right to sever invalid 
reservations while leaving State bound to the original treaty provision). 
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protection of States’ rights in opposition to human rights.  In fact, 
State consent is critical to the protection of human rights. 
The consent principle protects the collective right to self-
determination.  The right to self-determination grants all peoples a 
continuing entitlement to use their respective States to self-direct 
development free from external intervention.12  This right reflects 
the intrinsic value that communities who share a common life 
place on self-government as a vehicle to make decisions about how 
to develop as a society.13  Consent protects self-determination 
because it gives the people of the State the right to decide which 
international human rights obligations to accept, which in turn 
conditions the manner in which society develops.14 
This connection between consent and self-determination is 
important for two reasons.  First, consent is both an aid and an 
impediment to the protection of human rights.  While the latter is 
well accounted for in human rights scholarship, the former is not.  
Second, because the consent principle is an essential component of 
the human right to self-determination, infringements upon the 
principle must be supported by a legitimate human rights reason 
and be proportionate to that reason.  Such analysis is rarely, if ever, 
conducted by those advocating for diminishment of the consent 
principle. 
Proportionality analysis reveals two important realities about 
existing practice.  First, the only accepted human rights rationale 
within practice to date for restricting self-determination is the need 
to enforce accepted community obligations on outlier States.  
                                                     
12 Self-determination is a treaty-based right located in both Covenants.  See 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, para. 1, Dec. 19, 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (“All peoples have the right of self-
determination.  By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status 
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”); 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 1, para. 1, 
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR] (containing the same language 
as appears in Article 1(1) of the ICCPR).  Given that most States of the world are 
parties to either the ICCPR or ICESCR, the self-determination right described 
herein applies to most States.  Though there are strong arguments that the 
conception of self-determination described here is also customary, this Article 
does not take on the task of proving that this is so. 
13 See infra notes 155–59 and accompanying text (describing philosophical 
underpinnings of self-determination). 
14 See James Crawford, Democracy and International Law, 64 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 
113, 121 (1993) (claiming a heightened interest for popular participation on human 
rights questions given their impact on the internal life of the State).  
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Though some of the restrictions on self-determination described in 
this Article advance this accepted rationale, others do not.  Where 
there is no accepted community obligation at stake, those 
interested in restricting consent must identify an alternative 
human rights justification.  This Article explores some alternatives. 
Second, the strength of the justification required to restrict self-
determination varies depending upon the extent to which the 
consent principle is constricted.  The developments in human 
rights lawmaking described here vary greatly in terms of their 
level of infringement on self-determination and, therefore, the 
strength of the human rights rationale needed to support the 
restriction. 
This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part 1 lays out the 
problems associated with the application of the consent principle 
to human rights law.  Part 2 argues that this conventional account 
should be reconsidered given that State consent is essential to the 
protection of the human right to self-determination.  Part 3 argues 
that aspects of human rights practice should be reconsidered in 
light of this important role for State consent. 
2.  THE HUMAN RIGHTS CONSENT PROBLEM 
This Part undertakes four tasks.  First, it describes the 
traditional State sovereignty driven account of consent in 
international lawmaking.  Second, it explains why and how this 
account has been challenged by the emergence of human rights as 
a central guiding principle of the international system.  Third, this 
Part describes efforts to ameliorate these concerns.  Fourth, it 
examines the scholarly critiques of these reform efforts. 
2.1.  The Consent Principle 
There is no more axiomatic rule in international law than the 
consent principle propounded by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice in the Lotus Case:  a State is bound only by 
those international legal obligations to which it consents.15  This 
rule emanates from a natural law conception of States:  States, like 
men, are free, independent and equal entities in the state of 
                                                     
15 See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7) (“The 
rules of law binding upon States . . . emanate from their own free will . . . . 
Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed.”). 
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nature.16  As such, States possess rights by virtue of being States, 
the bundle of which constitute international legal sovereignty.17  
Sovereignty includes recognition that States as autonomous entities 
have the right to decide whether to surrender a portion of their 
natural freedom and enter into international obligations.18  Consent 
is a marker of the State’s agreement to limit its autonomy pursuant 
to a commitment to the international community.19 
In practice, this account of international law is incomplete.  
Treaties and customary law respect State consent in different ways, 
and customary law in particular has nonconsensual elements. 
States create treaty obligations through their affirmative 
consent.20  States use reservations to modify the content of the 
treaty obligation to match their consent.21  Reservations to 
multilateral human rights treaties are permissible so long as they 
                                                     
16 EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS xiii (Joseph Chitty ed., 1863). 
17 See STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 14 (1999) 
(explaining that international legal sovereignty is derived from Vattel’s concept of 
equal States living together in the state of nature).  State sovereignty remains the 
formal guiding principle of the international legal system.  See U.N. Charter art. 2, 
para. 1 (“The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of 
all its Members.”); id. at art. 2, para. 7 (“Nothing contained in the present Charter 
shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state . . . .”). 
18 See Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values, and Functions, 216 
RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 26–29 (1989) (“State autonomy suggests that a State is not 
subject to any external authority unless it has voluntarily consented to such 
authority.”); see also Ambassador Richard N. Haass, Director, State Dep’t Policy 
Planning Staff, Remarks to the School of Foreign Service and the Mortara Center 
for International Studies at Georgetown University: Sovereignty: Existing Rights, 
Evolving Responsibilities (Jan. 14, 2003) available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/ 
/p/rem/2003/16648.htm (describing the attributes of sovereignty in a post-
Westphalian world). 
19 Consent is manifested through formal mechanisms, such as signature of 
the treaty or exchange of instruments of ratification.  See Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties art. 11, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT] 
(“The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty may be expressed by signature, 
exchange of instruments constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession, or by any other means if so agreed.”). 
20 See Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, at 21 (May 28) 
[hereinafter Genocide Convention Case] (“It is well established that in its treaty 
relations a State cannot be bound without its consent . . . .”). 
21 VCLT, supra note 19, at art. 1(d) (defining “reservation”). 
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do not violate the object and purpose of the treaty.22  Where a 
reservation is invalid, the reserving State is not bound by the 
provision without the reservation because it never consented to 
such an obligation.23  Rather, it is either not party to the treaty in its 
entirety, or simply not party to the provision with the disputed 
reservation. 
Traditional customary norms are located through uniform, 
extensive, and widespread state practice done with a sense of legal 
obligation (opinio juris).  Those States engaging in practice that 
leads to custom affirmatively consent to the norm by opting to act 
consistently with the rule.24  Customary law does not merely 
obligate those States participating in the norm creation, however, 
as all non-persistently objecting States are bound.  But not all States 
contribute practice relevant to the creation of each customary 
norm.  Sometimes States do not confront the issue that is the 
subject of the custom.  In other situations, the State may not have 
come into being until after the norm was formed.  States in those 
situations are bound by the customs absent persistent objection, 
thus creating an obligation without affirmative consent. 
The doctrine of tacit consent presumes consent from a failure to 
dissent from the norm.25  States can dissent from the formation of 
custom in two ways.  First, groups of States can prevent the 
formation of putative customary norms through contrary 
                                                     
22 Id. at art. 19(c); Genocide Convention Case, supra note 20, at 24 (“The object 
and purpose of the Convention . . . limit . . . the freedom of making reservations . . 
. .”). 
23 States generally self-police whether their reservations meet this 
requirement.  A reservation to a multilateral human rights treaty is valid as long 
as at least one other party to the treaty does not object to the reservation; if all 
State parties object—exceedingly unlikely with a multilateral human rights 
treaty—the reserving State is not a party to the treaty.  See VCLT, supra note 19, at 
art. 20(4)(c), (5).  Any particular State that objects to a reservation is free to decide 
that the treaty is not in force between it and the reserving State.  See id. at art 
20(4)(b) (“An objection by another contracting State to a reservation does not 
preclude the entry into force of the treaty as between the objecting and reserving 
States unless a contrary intention is definitely expressed by the objecting State . . . 
.”). 
24 See INT’L LAW ASS’N, LONDON CONFERENCE (2000), FINAL REPORT OF THE 
COMMITTEE: STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE FORMATION OF GENERAL 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 39 (2000) (explaining that those States whose 
practice initiates the formation of custom consent to be bound by the rule).  
25 See id. (explaining tacit consent theory).   
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practice.26  Contrary practice defeats the conclusion that a norm is 
custom if it is sufficient to disprove uniform, widespread, and 
extensive practice.  Second, traditional custom permits an outlier 
State—whose action in contradiction to the rule is insufficient to 
prevent the formation of custom—to block application of a 
customary rule to itself by openly and persistently objecting to the 
rule at the time it is created.27 
The fit between customary law and the consent principle is 
imperfect, however.  Jus cogens or peremptory norms are in some 
instances nonconsensual.  The VCLT defines a peremptory norm as 
“a norm accepted and recognized by the international community 
of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is 
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm 
of general international law having the same character.”28  Given 
that the test for a norm achieving peremptory status is general 
acceptance by the international community, there is by definition 
an element of consent in its achieving elevated status.29  
But general acceptance does not mean each and every State has 
consented.  Once a norm achieves jus cogens status, dissenting 
States lose the right to remain outside the norm through persistent 
objection.  As a consequence, it is possible that a jus cogens norm 
will bind a State that affirmatively indicated a desire not to be 
bound by the norm.  For example, once the apartheid norm became 
peremptory, it bound South Africa and Rhodesia, even if they were 
persistent objectors to such a norm in the past.30 
Moreover, the doctrine of tacit consent appears illusory.  The 
tacit consent doctrine presumes States agree to customary norms 
when assuming statehood because acceptance of customary law is 
an inherent part of being a State.31  But assuming people within a 
                                                     
26 See id. at 9 n.21 (“[C]ontrary practice can undermine and, if sufficiently 
constant and widespread, destroy an existing customary rule.”). 
27 See id. at 27 (affirming validity of persistent objector rule). 
28 VCLT, supra note 19, at art. 53. 
29 See Henkin, supra note 18, at 61 (1989) (describing “authentic systemic 
consent”).  
30 See Jonathan I. Charney, The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of 
Customary International Law, 56 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 15 (1985) (analyzing why the 
jus cogens prohibition on apartheid bound South Africa and Rhodesia despite their 
apparent persistent objection). 
31 See ANTHONY D’AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCESS AND PROSPECT 13–25 
(1987) (explaining customary norms are inherited obligations required to 
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State opted out of statehood to avoid a customary norm, whichever 
State is sovereign over those people and within that territory 
would nevertheless be bound by the norm.32  Thus, new State or 
not, all people reside within the jurisdiction of a sovereign bound 
by the norm, rendering consent illusory.  Similar criticism can be 
made toward attributing tacit consent to States who were unaware 
entirely of the formation of a custom until after it was formed.33  
Lack of knowledge about putative customary law is not equivalent 
to consent. 
These two areas of practice demonstrate inconsistencies with 
respect to the role of State consent in traditional international legal 
theory and practice.  An accurate rendition of the consent principle 
provides that State consent is the primary and typical route by 
which international legal obligations are created with limited 
departures in customary law. 
2.2. Human Rights Criticism of the Consent Principle 
Human rights scholars challenge the consent principle as an 
impediment to the protection of human rights.  Human rights 
theory provides that humans, not States, ought to be the central 
animating figures of international law.34  The State is not a true 
person of course, and its anthropomorphic characterization misses 
                                                     
participate in the international order); THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 44–45 (1995) (describing these rules as 
associative obligations of participation in the international system). 
32 See, e.g., J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. 
J. INT’L L. 449, 513 (2000) (stating inconsistencies in customary practice).  
33 See Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 529, 
537 (1993) (criticizing the practice of giving weight to State silence when “many 
states do not know that the law is being made and thus have not formed an 
opinion”). 
34 See, e.g., ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY AND SELF-DETERMINATION: 
MORAL FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 289–327 (Will Kymlicka et al. eds., 
2004) (arguing that a justice-based account of legitimacy oriented around 
protection of human rights should replace State sovereignty as the legitimating 
principle for international law); FERNANDO R. TESÓN, A PHILOSOPHY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 57 (1998) (describing shift in focus of the international legal 
system based upon an acceptance that internal legitimacy of States to people 
should be the foundation of respect for State sovereignty).  Anne Peters goes still 
further, arguing that the contest between State sovereignty and human rights as 
the “Grundnorm” for international law has been resolved in favor of human 
rights.  Anne Peters, Humanity as the A and Ω of Sovereignty, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 513, 
514 (2009). 
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why States matter:  they are primarily discretionary associations 
that exist to advance the interests of their people.  As such, State 
sovereignty is valuable only for the instrumental benefits it 
provides for the protection of human rights.35 
The diminishment of the importance of sovereignty within 
human rights theory undermines the foundations of the consent 
principle.  While a primarily voluntary legal system protects States’ 
rights, that goal is less salient as sovereignty wanes in importance.  
As critically, the consent requirement arguably impedes the 
protection of human rights in at least three ways. 
First, the consent principle results in international human 
rights regulation akin to a thin slice of Swiss cheese.  It contains 
holes in coverage because a State or group of States may decline to 
consent to an otherwise widely agreed-to treaty norm, or may 
block application of a custom to it through persistent objection.  
The regulations that do exist are characterized by a “relative lack of 
normativity,” in order to foster consensus between widely 
divergent cultures and self-interested governments.36 
Consider, for example, the mandate found in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) that States 
criminally prohibit hate speech that amounts to incitement of 
discrimination, hostility, or violence.37  Some States like China are 
not parties to the ICCPR at all; others, like the United States, have 
taken a reservation to the treaty that restricts the application of the 
provision within its territory.38  Thus, there are geographic spaces 
where this provision does not apply. 
                                                     
35 See TESÓN, supra note 34, at 40 (arguing that sovereignty is valuable for its 
instrumental benefits in protecting human rights and has moral weight only with 
respect to States that are internally legitimate); Peters, supra note 34, at 514 (“State 
sovereignty . . . has a legal value only to the extent that it respects human rights, 
interests, and needs.”). 
36 See Philip Alston, Introduction, in HUMAN RIGHTS LAW xi, xii (Philip Alston 
ed., 1996) (providing standard critique of human rights law).  
37 See ICCPR, supra note 12, at art. 20, para. 2 (“Any advocacy of national, 
racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or 
violence shall be prohibited by law.”).  
38 The U.S. reservation excludes any obligation to pass criminal laws 
inconsistent with the First Amendment to U.S. Constitution.  See International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/I
V-4.en.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2013) (providing a full record of all U.S. 
reservations to the ICCPR). 
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Moreover, the terms like “national, racial, or religious hatred” 
are subject to divergent interpretations, especially given cultural 
differences.39  This vagueness gives States wide interpretative 
latitude over the content of human rights norms.40  While such 
vagueness is frequently characteristic of rights generally, 
municipal legal systems include adjudicatory institutions whose 
job it is to fill gaps in statutory and constitutional language.41  By 
contrast, the ICCPR creates no adjudicatory institution with a 
mandate to provide a binding interpretation of what these terms 
mean for the Parties.42  The result is that States have such wide 
interpretative discretion that most or all conduct may conceivably 
be defended as consistent with the rule. 
A relatively thin, gap-riddled international human rights 
regulatory scheme protects States’ rights.  Geographic gaps in 
coverage respect the right of the sovereign in that territory to opt 
out of international regulation.  The thinness of the norms 
preserves States’ flexibility in application of the norms.   
But such a system has normative problems from the 
perspective of the protection of human rights.  It prevents 
realization of universal human rights, a core objective of the 
human rights movement,43 because the same right means different 
things in different places.44 
                                                     
39 ICCPR, supra note 12, at art. 20, para. 20.  See Bruno Simma, International 
Human Rights and General International Law: A Comparative Analysis, in IV 
COLLECTED COURSES OF THE EUROPEAN ACADEMY 153, 188 (1995) (arguing that 
cultural diversity among treaty parties makes a shared meaning for treaty terms 
hard to find). 
40 See Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International 
Human Rights Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 38, 60–63 (2003) (“[T]he relatively open 
meaning of the basic norms of international human rights law leaves a great deal 
of interpretive latitude to states.”).  
41 See Harlan Grant Cohen, International Law’s Erie Moment, 34 MICH. J. INT'L 
L. 249, 250–55 (2013) (contrasting acceptance that municipal courts will engage in 
gap filling with concerns about international adjudicatory institutions engaging in 
similar activities). 
42 As discussed later, the ICCPR creates a Human Rights Committee to 
monitor State compliance, which has at times asserted a right to play this role, 
although such a role was not formally granted in the treaty.  See NOWAK, infra note 
82, at 668–69 (characterizing the Human Rights Committee as a “quasi-judicial 
organ” in large part due to its "lack of internationally binding effect"). 
43 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 2, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Everyone is entitled to all the rights 
and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as 
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It may also provide insufficient protection to people from 
abuse by States.  States can exploit gaps in the law to abuse 
people.45  The United States, for example, used the existence of 
gaps in the legal framework governing conflicts with non-State 
actors to arguably torture detainees in its conflict with al Qaida.46  
Preventing such abuses from occurring is a core objective of the 
human rights movement. 
Second, the consent principle slows the pace of development of 
human rights norms.  The traditional international lawmaking 
mechanism has an inherent “status quo bias” because of the 
hurdles that exist with respect to creating new law or altering 
existing law.47  This bias is particularly stark with respect to human 
rights. 
Securing consensus between groups of States on new human 
rights treaty obligations is a cumbersome process due to deep 
cultural differences that exist with respect to the practices that are 
the subject of human rights norms.  Once treaties exist, any 
amendments must be approved by a State party before it is bound, 
which empowers laggard States to resist changes unless their 
particular concerns are addressed.48  Though the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties allows regular practice between 
treaty parties to modify the meaning of a treaty without new 
                                                     
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status.”).   
44 See Fernando R. Tesón, International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism, 
25 VA. J. INT’L L. 869, 877–79 (1985) (worrying that “international human rights” 
loses its meaning if it means different things in different places). 
45 See Louis Henkin, Univ. Professor Emeritus & Special Serv. Professor, 
Columbia Univ., That “S” Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human 
Rights, Et Cetera, Address at Fordham University School of Law (Feb. 23, 1999), in 
68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 12 (1999) (condemning States who abuse gaps in law made 
possible by sovereignty to commit atrocities). 
46 See John B. Bellinger III & Vijay M. Padmanabhan, Detention Operations in 
Contemporary Conflicts: Four Challenges for the Geneva Conventions and Other Existing 
Law, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 201, 204 (2011) (describing risks inherent in acknowledging 
gaps in international law). 
47 See Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Common Law: 
The Soft Law of International Tribunals, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 515, 525–26 (2009) (arguing 
that a desire to overcome this bias partially explains the use of “soft law”).   
48 See VCLT, supra note 19, at art. 40, para. 4 (“The amending agreement does 
not bind any State already a party to the treaty which does not become a party to 
the amending agreement . . . .”). 
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negotiations,49 there is limited inter-State practice on human rights 
questions because most human rights activity takes place within 
the State.50 
The process of locating new customary norms is even slower.51  
Demonstrating that there is a pattern of uniform, widespread, and 
extensive State practice with respect to a human rights norm will 
take significant time, both to actually develop and to be 
documented by the actor seeking to establish a custom.  The pace 
may be further retarded by the search for evidence of opinio juris, 
separate and apart from the consistent practice.52 
This slow pace of legal development is a function of a system 
oriented toward protecting States’ rights.  States make a 
momentous choice when opting to surrender a portion of their 
domestic sovereignty to international regulation, especially where 
the issue in question is the relationship between the government 
and its people.  They must be afforded proper time to make this 
decision. 
But a slow pace of evolution potentially harms the protection of 
human rights.  Human rights terms, perhaps more than other 
kinds of treaty terms, acquire different meanings over time.53  For 
example, the meaning of “cruel, inhuman or degrading,”54 by 
definition is not static, as practices once widely accepted are later 
viewed as barbaric and inconsistent with human rights.  Allowing 
                                                     
49 See VCLT, supra note 19, at art. 31, para. 3 (attributing weight in treaty 
interpretation to subsequent practice between treaty parties). 
50 See Simma, supra note 39, at 187–88 (describing lack of practice).  Most 
practice, such that it is, consists of statements made at bodies like the Human 
Rights Council and the Third Committee. 
51 See Bin Cheng, Custom: The Future of General State Practice in a Divided 
World, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL 
PHILOSOPHY DOCTRINE AND THEORY 513, 514 (R. St.J. Macdonald & Douglas M. 
Johnston eds., 1983) (quoting Sir Robert Jennings) (“Customary law . . . is based 
upon the passage of a long period of time . . . .”).  
52 See John B. Bellinger, III & William J. Haynes II, A US Government Response 
to the International Committee of the Red Cross Study Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, 89 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 443, 446–47 (2007) (arguing that ICRC 
erred in conflating state practice and opinio juris in its customary IHL study). 
53 See Andrew Drzemczewski, The Sui Generis Nature of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, 29 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 54, 61–62 (1980) (describing the 
ECHR as evolving).  
54 See generally United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; 
ICCPR, supra note 12, at art. 7. 
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States to perpetrate conduct widely considered cruel today because 
such conduct was viewed as permissible at earlier points in time is 
difficult to reconcile with the purpose of protecting human rights.55 
2.3. Loosening the Consent Principle 
Given these tensions between State consent and international 
human rights, it is not surprising that many scholars, human rights 
advocates, and human rights institutions have sought to loosen the 
consent requirement.  This Part describes these efforts. 
2.3.1. Customary Law 
Though there has always been a nonconsensual element to 
customary law, the ability of States to dissent from customary 
norms is on the wane.  The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has 
promulgated a rule, now widely accepted, that makes it harder for 
States to dissent from putative customary law through contrary 
behavior.56 
Under traditional doctrine, all instances of contrary State 
practice are accounted for in determining whether widespread, 
uniform practice fueled by opinio juris exists to create customary 
law.57  This rule has made it difficult for human rights custom to 
form because large amounts of contradictory State practice exist 
even with respect to the most sacred human rights, such as the 
prohibition on torture.58 
Such a rule protects the right of States to dissent from 
customary law through practice.  But it appears not to protect 
human rights.  Customary law provides a unique opportunity to 
bind all States to any particular norm, given the risk that some 
                                                     
55 See Drzemczewski, supra note 53, at 62 (arguing ECHR needs to evolve to 
“keep pace with social and legal advances made within the domestic legal 
structures of member States”). 
56 See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing the ICJ’s holding in the 
Nicaragua Case). 
57 The methodology for determining whether a practice is customary law is 
to look for “extensive and virtually uniform” State practice to support a custom.  
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 74 (Feb. 20).  States 
may try and alter customary law by engaging in contrary practice, but such 
practice must also “obtain[] the acquiescence of others” or be incorporated into a 
treaty amendment for it to supplant custom.  INT’L LAW ASS’N, supra note 24, at 25.  
58 See Bellinger & Padmanabhan, supra note 46, at 212–13 (describing 
difficulties inherent in locating human rights custom). 
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number of States will choose not to join any particular human 
rights treaty.  Thus, the harder it is to create customary law, the 
more likely it is that there will be geographic gaps in human rights 
protection.  Moreover, the traditional rule enshrines a slow pace 
for legal development given the indefinite and perhaps infinite 
time it will take for the world’s States to arrive at widespread, 
extensive, and uniform practice with respect to any human rights 
question. 
The ICJ sought to modify this rule in the Nicaragua Case.59  In 
that case, the Court evaluated whether the prohibition on the use 
of force and intervention in the internal affairs of other States, 
found in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, is customary law.60  There 
are many examples of States violating the literal terms of Article 
2(4), making it difficult to establish customary law under the 
traditional test.61  But the ICJ announced that inconsistent State 
practice should be treated as a violation of the custom, as opposed 
to evidence that no custom exists, if the State justifies its conduct 
consistently with the custom.62 
While this ruling was made in the context of the law governing 
armed conflict, its impact has been felt more intensely in 
international human rights law.  The ability of States to dissent 
from a putative human rights custom through contrary behavior is 
                                                     
59 The powers of the ICJ are limited to deciding disputes between States, and 
it has no formal authority to alter rules on the formation of custom.  Statute of the 
International Court of Justice art. 59, June 26, 1945, 3 U.S.T. 1153 [hereinafter ICJ 
Statute] (“The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the 
parties and in respect of that particular case.”).  But the ICJ approach in the 
Nicaragua Case has been widely adopted by States and scholars as the method for 
evaluating contrary practice in the context of human rights and humanitarian 
norms.  See, e.g., Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Customary International Humanitarian 
Law: A Response to US Comments, 89 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 473, 478–86 (2007) 
(arguing application of Nicaragua rule is essential to prevent “violators [from] 
dictat[ing] the law or stand[ing] in the way of rules emerging”).   
60 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”). 
61 Indeed, the Court in the Nicaragua Case itself found that the United States 
and Nicaragua both violated Article 2(4) of the Charter by providing weapons 
and logistical support to rebel groups in Nicaragua and El Salvador, respectively.  
Nicaragua Case, supra note 8, ¶ 195.   
62 Id. ¶ 187 (finding that the content of Article 2(4) was indeed customary 
law). 
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significantly compromised.  Rather than contrary practice 
registering dissent, States’ explanations of their actions are also 
evaluated. 
On the surface, this change may not appear dramatic; if a State 
does not believe a rule exists, why would it attempt to defend its 
action consistent with the putative rule?  In reality, States have 
political or economic reasons to describe their conduct in a manner 
that is pleasing to the international community, which are 
unrelated to accepting the existence of a legal obligation.63  
Requiring States to disavow those contrary policy objectives in 
order to dissent from creation of a customary norm imposes 
potentially significant additional costs on dissent. 
Consider the sometimes proclaimed customary duty to 
prosecute those involved in international crimes, such as genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and serious war crimes.  Scholars have 
described this duty as customary64 despite the regularity with 
which States have granted amnesties to those who allegedly 
committed such crimes.65  They make this claim by using the 
Nicaragua rule to convert the contrary practice of States into a form 
of consent to the rule.  These scholars argue that if a State granting 
amnesty invokes exigent circumstances—like national 
reconciliation or fragility of the democratic transition—to explain 
amnesties, they are implicitly accepting that they need to explain 
deviations from the rule.66  Why else would they feel the need to 
offer an explanation for choosing amnesties over prosecutions? 
                                                     
63 See Bellinger & Haynes, supra note 52, at 445 (explaining that States will 
verbally support resolutions at international organizations for reasons that have 
nothing to do with judgment on the existence of a legal norm). 
64 See, e.g., Carla Edelenbos, Human Rights Violations: A Duty to Prosecute?, 7 
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 5, 15–16 (1994) (arguing there is customary duty to prosecute war 
crimes and crimes against humanity and a developing custom with respect to 
human rights violations); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Comment, State Responsibility to 
Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human Rights Violations in International Law, 78 CAL. 
L. REV. 449, 489 (1990) (describing an “emerging” customary duty to prosecute). 
65 See Charles P. Trumbull IV, Giving Amnesties a Second Chance, 25 BERKELEY J. 
INT’L L. 283, 295–99 (2007) (marshaling significant evidence of States’ practices 
which are inconsistent with the existence of a customary duty).  
66 See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 64, at 496–97 (dismissing amnesties offered by 
Uruguay, Chile, and El Salvador as contrary practice disproving a customary duty 
to prosecute); see also Edelenbos, supra note 64, at 21 (making general point).  But 
see Michael Scharf, The Letter of the Law: The Scope of the International Legal 
Obligation to Prosecute Human Rights Crimes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41, 58 
(1996) (disputing factual accuracy of claim). 
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But, in reality, such States may not accept a duty to prosecute.  
States which use amnesties may have felt constrained not to openly 
reject the existence of a duty to prosecute because they feared that 
departures from a pro-human rights stance would disrupt Western 
aid upon which the States were dependent.  Thus, even though 
their statements acknowledge that Western States might view a 
duty to prosecute as customary, they may not be a statement of 
agreement to that effect.  Alternatively, States simply may have 
been offering reasons why they opted for one policy over another, 
with no intention of accepting any legal obligation.  Requiring 
States to forego those policy or economic benefits to record dissent 
from the duty to prosecute imposes a significant new burden on 
the consent principle.67 
International human rights practice has also seen a dramatic 
increase in claims from scholars and advocates that human rights 
are peremptory, and therefore bind even dissenting States.  The 
persistent objection rule in customary law protects the consent 
principle by giving States the right to opt out of customs with 
which they disagree through timely, persistent, and open objection 
to the rule.68  As described in Part 1.1, the consent principle 
recognizes a limited exception to this rule in the case of 
peremptory norms, identified as such by their recognition and 
acceptance by the international community of States.69  The 
existence of this exception reflects willingness, even in the 
sovereignty-driven account of consent, to recognize that a small 
number of peremptory norms will trump the sovereign right of 
individual States to control the content of their international legal 
obligations. 
                                                     
67 Bruno Simma argues that the Nicaragua rule is justifiable when evaluating 
practice that is inconsistent with an existing rule of custom, but far less sensible 
when examining practice to determine whether there is custom in the first place.  
Simma, supra note 39, at 220.  The diminishment of the consent principle only 
arises in the latter circumstance.  States have traditionally enjoyed the ability to 
dissent from the formation of custom through contrary practice, a right made 
more difficult by this rule.  By contrast, once a rule is formed, States have no right 
to dissent through contrary practice, as such conduct would be a violation of the 
rule until sufficient practice has accumulated to defeat the conclusion that the rule 
still exists. 
68 See supra Section 2.1 (discussing the foundation of the consent principle 
and the persistent objector rule). 
69 See VCLT, supra note 19, at art. 53 (defining peremptory norm). 
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But an important benefit accrues for the protection of 
international human rights from increasing the number of 
peremptory norms.  Jus cogens norms solve the problem of 
geographic gaps in coverage because they are by definition 
applicable globally, not providing States the opportunity to dissent 
through persistent objection.70  Not surprisingly then, human 
rights advocates and scholars have created a cottage industry in 
proclaiming human rights norms jus cogens.71 
Some notable human rights scholars contend that all human 
rights are jus cogens.72  Other scholars, taking a slightly more 
restrained view, have argued that a wide range of human rights 
norms are jus cogens, including the duty to assassinate political 
leaders in certain circumstances,73 the right to development,74 and 
the right to free trade.75 
In making these pronouncements, scholars and activists must 
wrestle with the difficulty of establishing that a particular norm or 
body of norms is generally accepted and recognized as peremptory 
                                                     
70 Jonathan Charney made a more direct effort at restricting the right of 
persistent objection, arguing that persistent objection be permitted only during 
the period before a custom is formed.  If that objection was insufficient to prevent 
the formation of custom, even those States, which had been in persistent and open 
objection to the norm, should be bound, he contended.  Charney, supra note 30, at 
22.  Professor Charney’s argument has not been widely adopted, however.  See 
INT’L LAW ASS’N, supra note 24, at 27 (confirming existence of persistent objector 
rule despite scholarly criticism). 
71 Prosper Weil predicted this outcome in 1983, stating “virtually nothing . . . 
prevent[s] an irresistible tide of rules of general international law from swelling, 
one after another, [into] the category of high grade norms . . . .”  Prosper Weil, 
Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 413, 427 (1983). 
72 See Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State “Sovereignty,” 25 GA. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 31, 38–39 (1995–96) (arguing all of human rights law is jus cogens to 
which persistent objection does not apply); Simma, supra note 39, at 229–230 
(asserting persistent objection is inconsistent with the structure of human rights).  
73 See Louis René Beres, Prosecuting Iraqi Crimes Against Israel During the Gulf 
War: Jerusalem’s Rights Under International Law, 9 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 337, 357–
58 (1992) (arguing Israel may have a jus cogens duty to assassinate Saddam 
Hussein). 
74 See Shashank Upadhye, The International Watercourse: An Exploitable 
Resource for the Developing Nation Under International Law?, 8 CARDOZO J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 61, 66–68 (2000) (citing to General Assembly resolutions to support this 
claim). 
75 Michael H. Allen, Globalization and Peremptory Norms in International Law: 
From Westphalian to Global Constitutionalism?, 41 INT’L POL. 341, 342 (2004) 
(commenting on how the “the problem of markets has produced a new 
peremptory norm, that of Free Trade”). 
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by the international community of States as a whole.  Scholars and 
activists often have asserted that norms fall into this category 
without the presentation of much—or any—evidence that there is 
general support in the international community for treating the 
norms as such.76 
As an example consider again the customary duty to prosecute.  
Some scholars argue that this duty is not only customary, but also 
jus cogens and thereby not subject to persistent objection.77  But they 
do so without providing evidence that there is general acceptance 
in the international community that this duty is non-derogable.  M. 
Cherif Bassiouni, for example, asserts the duty to prosecute is 
“inderogable” and “mandatory” based upon the conclusions of the 
international community that crimes which are the subject of the 
duty are peremptory limitations on State power.78  Bassiouni 
makes no effort to catalog evidence that the duty to prosecute itself 
is viewed as peremptory by States. 
While many States have engaged in practice inconsistent with 
the norm historically, in recent years African States have openly 
challenged the legal status of the duty to prosecute.  These States 
argue that such a duty impedes peace, and have pushed to 
reconsider the role of amnesties in transitional societies.79  
Amnesties issued by such States would count against the existence 
of custom even under the Nicaragua rule because the contrary 
practice is accompanied by verbal rejection of the custom.  But if 
characterized as jus cogens, amnesties issued by African States are 
simply illegal under international law because persistent objection 
is not recognized.  The result is that geographic gaps in coverage of 
                                                     
76 See Shelton, supra note 9, at 292 (criticizing the practice of writers and 
international tribunals to assert norms as peremptory “without presenting any 
evidence”).  
77 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Searching for Peace and Justice: The Need for 
Accountability, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 17 (1996) (arguing that jus cogens 
nature of crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes, and torture creates a jus 
cogens duty to prosecute); Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to 
Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L. J. 2537, 2608–09 
(1990–1991) (describing the ways in which a position permitting derogations from 
the duty to prosecute is “untenable”). 
78 Bassiouni, supra note 77, at 17. 
79 See Vijay M. Padmanabhan, From Rome to Kampala: The U.S. Approach to the 
2010 International Criminal Court Review Conference, 55 COUNCIL SPEC. REP. 3, 18 
(describing concerns of African States at the 2010 ICC Review Conference). 
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human rights norms are closed at the cost of the right of States to 
dissent from such norms. 
2.3.2. Treaty Law 
Unlike customary law, treaty law has traditionally epitomized 
the consent principle—States only have those treaty obligations to 
which they have consented.  But TMB and human rights courts 
have used techniques in interpreting their treaties that diminish the 
consent principle. 
Human rights treaties have created a range of institutions to 
monitor treaty compliance and/or adjudicate disputes arising 
under treaties.  Most U.N. sponsored international human rights 
treaties have TMB, which are empowered to monitor State 
compliance with the treaties.80  In the course of their duties, TMB 
issue concluding observations regarding State performance with 
the treaty, general comments regarding interpretation of the treaty, 
and, in some cases, views on disputes regarding compliance with 
the treaty raised by private actors and States.81  As a formal matter, 
TMB have not been given lawmaking authority.82  But as a 
practical matter, their treaty interpretations are very influential in 
shaping States’ understandings with regard to their obligations 
under the treaty. 
The International Law Association found that most States, 
while rejecting any formal lawmaking authority for TMB, in 
practice use the interpretation provided by TMB as the applicable 
legal standard, whether in reporting on compliance to the TMB or 
in interpreting the treaty in their national courts.83  Even in the rare 
                                                     
80 There are currently eight human rights treaty monitoring bodies with a 
ninth body, covering disabilities, slated to come into existence.  See Kerstin 
Mechlem, Treaty Bodies and the Interpretation of Human Rights, 42 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 905, 914 (2009) (listing the human rights treaty monitoring bodies). 
81 See Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. HUM. RTS.: OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R 
FOR HUM. RTS., http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/treaty/index.htm (last 
visited Nov. 2, 2012) (describing three primary functions of treaty bodies as 
concluding observations, communications, and general comments).  
82 The ICCPR parties, for example, intended the HRC to play a supporting 
role in assisting the Parties in implementing the treaty, not a court-like legal 
development role.  MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL 
RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY 669 (2d ed. 2005) (explaining the decision to name the 
HRC a “committee” instead of a “court” or “tribunal”). 
83 INT’L LAW ASS’N, BERLIN CONFERENCE (2004), FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT 
OF FINDINGS OF THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES 631–57 (2004). 
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instances where a State puts forward an alternative interpretation, 
the TMB interpretation is used as a baseline for a dialogue with the 
State on the nature of the obligation in question.84 
Some regional human rights instruments have created human 
rights courts with jurisdiction to hear disputes arising under the 
treaty.85  Unlike TMB, the pronouncements of these courts are 
binding with respect to the parties to the case.86  The decisions of 
these courts are not formally binding on other parties to the 
treaty.87  But the likelihood that subsequent cases will be brought 
against the State parties resulting in a similar outcome creates an 
even stronger impetus for compliance by all parties than TMB 
interpretations.88 
 The traditional approach to treaty interpretation uses the 
expectations of the State parties to the treaty as the touchstone for 
interpretation.89  Such a rule protects State sovereignty by leaving 
                                                     
84 For example, while the United States disagrees with the HRC’s 
interpretation of the ICCPR as covering extraterritorial conduct, it nevertheless 
provides information to it on such conduct.  See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, SECOND AND 
THIRD PERIODIC REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UN COMMITTEE 
ON HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND 
POLITICAL RIGHTS annex 1 (Oct. 21, 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl 
/rls /55504.htm (providing information on activities outside the territorial United 
States “as a courtesy matter”).  Doing so spawned an iterative dialogue between 
the United States and the HRC on U.S. extraterritorial activities that mirrored the 
dialogue on activities taking place in the United States. 
85 See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms art. 19, Nov. 9, 9150, 1950 C.E.T.S. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 
[hereinafter “ECHR”] (establishing the European Court of Human Rights); 
American Convention on Human Rights art. 33, 52, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M 673 
(1970) [hereinafter “American Convention”] (creating the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights). 
86 See ECHR, supra note 85, at art. 46(1) (describing the jurisdiction of these 
courts as “compulsory” in “all matters concerning the interpretation and 
application of the present Convention”); American Convention, supra note 85, at 
art. 68(1) (“The States Parties to the Convention undertake to comply with the 
judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties.”). 
87 See, e.g., American Convention, supra note 85, at art. 68(1) (affirming that 
only States party to a decision are bound by it). 
88 See Laurence R. Helfer & Erik Voeten, International Courts as Agents of Legal 
Change: Evidence from LGBT Rights in Europe, 67 INT’L ORG. (forthcoming 2013) 
(arguing that gay rights decisions by the ECtHR have influenced policies of States 
that are not parties to the decision). 
89 Such an approach is not the same as an originalist approach to treaty 
interpretation.  The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which employs a 
consent-based approach to treaty interpretation, requires treaties be interpreted as 
the parties would agree today.  To that end, while the negotiating history of the 
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in the hands of States alone the creation and modification of treaty 
obligations.  It is incumbent upon non-State institutions engaged in 
treaty interpretation to display fealty to State expectations so as to 
avoid infringing on State autonomy. 
But such an interpretative technique is dissonant with a system 
oriented around the protection of human rights, as discussed in 
Part 2.2.  Securing consensus on treaty terms requires negotiating 
terms that are open-ended and vague, with wide latitude in 
implementation.  Simply applying the provisions as drafted might 
result in little restriction on State conduct.  Fealty to the 
expectations of the State parties will also retard the evolution of 
human rights treaty terms, given the paucity of inter-State practice 
available to alter the original meaning of the terms. 
To ameliorate these concerns, human rights bodies engaged in 
treaty interpretation often use a teleological approach to 
interpretation.  Such an approach is based upon the rule in the 
VCLT requiring treaties to be interpreted consistently with their 
object and purpose—here protecting human rights.90  These bodies 
argue that this purpose requires them to employ plausible 
interpretations of treaty text that are most favorable to human 
rights, as opposed to an interpretation that prioritizes fealty to 
State consent.91 
Two examples illustrate this approach.  First, the Women’s 
Committee has used a teleological approach to treaty 
interpretation to locate at least a partial right to an abortion within 
the Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW).92  CEDAW Article 12 provides that “States 
                                                     
treaty is relevant to interpretation, so too are subsequent agreements and inter-
State practice of treaty parties.  VCLT, supra note 19, at art. 31(3).   
90 VCLT, supra note 19, at art. 31(1) (requiring treaties be interpreted in light 
of their “object and purpose”). 
91 See, e.g., MATTHEW C.R. CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON 
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A PERSPECTIVE ON ITS DEVELOPMENT 3 
(Ian Brownlie ed., 1995) (describing the approach taken by the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights). 
92 The HRC has also engaged in a teleological approach to treaty 
interpretation on the abortion question.  It has interpreted Articles 7 and 17 of the 
ICCPR to require States to provide at least a medical exception to abortion laws.  
Llantoy Huamán v. Peru, Commc’n No. 1153/2003, ¶ 6.3–6.4, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/85/D/1153/2003 (U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. Nov. 22, 2005).  It has done 
so despite strong evidence that these provisions were not intended to cover 
abortion rights.  There was an intense debate about abortion in the context of 
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Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women in the field of health care in order to 
ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, access to health 
care services, including those related to family planning.”93 
There is strong evidence that the States negotiating this Article 
did not intend to eliminate laws criminalizing abortion.  States 
specifically rejected including the phrase “family planning 
services” within Article 12, because they feared that phrase would 
bring abortion into the article’s ambit, thereby hurting ratification 
rates.94  Moreover, States with restrictive abortion laws ratified the 
treaty without reservation to Article 12, which they would likely 
not have done if they thought the provisions implicated abortion.95  
Other States have, in their dialogue with the Women’s Committee, 
rejected the argument that Article 12 has implications for 
abortion.96  There was also no subsequent practice or agreement 
between the Parties modifying Article 12.97 
Despite the evidence that States did not intend to cover 
abortion within Article 12, and the absence of subsequent practice 
modifying the treaty, the Women’s Committee has nevertheless 
interpreted it to confer abortion rights. In its General 
                                                     
Article 6.  See NOWAK, supra note 82, at 153–55 (describing debate regarding 
whether Article 6 “life” begins at conception).  The absence of such a debate in the 
context of Articles 7 and 17, as well as the decision of States with total abortion 
bans to join those provisions without reservation, suggests strongly that these 
provisions were not intended to have abortion implications. 
93 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women art. 12(1), adopted Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.  
94 See LARS ADAM REHOF, GUIDE TO THE TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION 
AGAINST WOMEN 145 (1993) (noting the rejection of the term “family planning 
services”). 
95 See DOUGLAS A. SYLVA & SUSAN YOSHIHARA, INT’L ORGS. RESEARCH GRP., 
RIGHTS BY STEALTH: THE ROLE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES IN THE 
CAMPAIGN FOR AN INTERNATIONAL RIGHT TO ABORTION 31–32 (2009), available at 
http://c-fam.org/images/WhitePapers/Rights.By.Stealth.pdf (explaining how 
States did not construe Article 12 to include reproductive rights).  
96 See id. at 42–44 (describing efforts by treaty bodies to use expansive 
interpretations of treaty provisions to override democratic opposition to legalizing 
abortion in Poland, Ireland, Namibia, and Nicaragua). 
97 Such subsequent agreements are exceedingly rare in human rights law, 
given that most practice is intra-State rather than inter-State.  Simma, supra note 
39, at 188.  Subsequent practice must be inter-State to modify the treaty in order to 
comply with the consent principle, as it must reflect a shared, agreed to change in 
interpretation of the treaty provisions. 
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Recommendation 24, the Women’s Committee explained that 
eliminating discrimination against women in the health services 
context requires removing legal barriers to women’s medical 
procedures, such as abortion.98  Such a requirement led the 
Women’s Committee to interpret Article 12 to require States to 
repeal “laws that criminalize medical procedures only needed by 
women.”99  Specifically, it stated that “legislation criminalizing 
abortion should be amended, in order to withdraw punitive 
measures imposed on women who undergo abortion,” when 
possible.100 
Another example of a teleological approach to treaty 
interpretation is found within the decisions of the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) on the right of non-refoulement, or right 
not to be transferred to face torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment.101  The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
does not contain an express non-refoulement provision.  Article 3 
of the ECHR prohibits torture, but does not make mention of 
transfers.102  European States parties have argued that they did not 
intend to create a non-refoulement obligation when negotiating 
Article 3,103 nor is there evidence that the subject was raised during 
the negotiations of the provision. 
                                                     
98 Rep. of the Comm. for Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 20th 
Sess., Jan. 19–Feb. 5, 1999, General Recommendation 24, art. 12, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. 
No. A/54/38/Rev.1; GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 38 (1999). 
99  Id. 
100  Id. ¶ 31(c). 
101 The HRC has similarly used an evolutionary interpretative approach to 
locate a non-refoulement right within Article 7 of the ICCPR.  U.N. Human Rights 
Comm., General Comment No. 31 [80]: The Nature of the General Legal 
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 80th Sess., Mar. 29, 2004, ¶ 
12, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004).  It has done so despite 
evidence that the Parties never intended for the prohibition on cruel, inhuman 
and degrading treatment to include a non-refoulement provision.  See Vijay M. 
Padmanabhan, To Transfer or Not to Transfer: Identifying and Protecting Relevant 
Human Rights Interests in Non-Refoulement, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 73, 107–112 (2011) 
(describing evidence to this effect). 
102 See ECHR, supra note 85, at art. 3 (“No one shall be subjected to torture or 
to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”). 
103 Observations of the Governments of Lithuania, Portugal, Slovakia, & the 
United Kingdom in the case of Ramzy v. Netherlands, App. No. 25424/05, Eur. 
Ct. H.R. (2005), available at http://www.redress.org/Government_intervenors 
_observations_in_Ramzy_case%20_21November.pdf.  
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Nevertheless, the ECtHR has used a teleological  approach to 
interpretation to locate within Article 3 non-refoulement 
protection.  The Court explained that the object and purpose of the 
treaty, which is to protect human rights, and “to promote the ideals 
and values of a democratic society,” requires expanding Article 
3.104  The Court found the Article 3 non-refoulement right to be 
absolute, rejecting potential security exceptions.105  It recently 
expanded the protection to include the right not to be transferred 
to face trial where evidence at that trial may have been obtained 
using torture.106 
Teleological treaty interpretation is difficult to reconcile with 
an international legal system oriented around State sovereignty.107  
When institutions depart from indicia of State consent in their 
treaty interpretations, they seek to use either their power to issue 
binding decisions or the power of the bully pulpit to constrict State 
                                                     
104 Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 27 (1989) (citation 
omitted). 
105 Chahal v. United Kingdom, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1831, 1855–56 (1996).  
106 Othman v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8139/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012).  
107 Scholars have made the argument that States in effect consent to human 
rights institutions engaging in gap filling when those institutions are given 
authority to make binding interpretations of the treaty.  See Bruno Simma, 
Consent: Strains in the Treaty System, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY DOCTRINE AND THEORY, supra 
note 51, at 485, 497 (arguing that the open-ended nature of human rights terms 
combined with creation of an adjudicatory institution invites judge-driven 
lawmaking).  Though the creation of these institutions implies consent to some 
judge-made law, it is unlikely that parties to treaties like the ECHR intended for 
human rights courts to depart from the general rule that the intent of the parties 
should be the touchstone for interpretation.  The United Kingdom, for example, 
has expressed its view that the ECtHR’s non-refoulement jurisprudence exceeds 
the Court’s mandate.  See John F. Burns, Britain Releases and Curbs Extremist, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 14, 2012, at A6 (describing the hostile reaction of Conservative MPs to 
ECtHR decision rejecting deportation of a radical Muslim cleric). 
  Andrew Guzman and Tim Meyer argue there is a division between parties 
to human rights treaties as to the extent to which they favor courts assuming a 
lawmaking function.  They contend that States that wish for greater international 
regulation of human rights create international adjudicatory institutions out of the 
expectation that these institutions will create jurisprudence that will, overtime, 
pressure non-participating States to accept greater levels of international 
supervision.  Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 171, 202 (2010).  This theory suggests that some State parties to a 
human rights treaty consent to teleological treaty interpretation, while other 
parties do not.  The constriction of the consent principle occurs with respect to 
non-consenting States. 
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prerogative in recognizing new international obligations.108  Such 
pressure constricts the consent principle to varying extents 
depending upon the intensity of coercion behind the effort.  
Coercion is greater with human rights courts, who issue binding 
judgments, than with TMB.  
They do so because of the benefits in ameliorating some of the 
concerns about a voluntary human rights system described in Part 
1.2.  These decisions add a detailed heft to previously thin 
provisions, thereby combating normative thinness.  They also 
allow potentially static treaty provisions to evolve with changing 
social expectations, which is unlikely to occur if one were to wait 
for States to “update” treaty terms through subsequent agreement 
or practice. 
One TMB interpretation with particular effect on the consent 
principle is the HRC’s jurisprudence on reservations.  A persistent 
source of irritation in human rights treaty practice for some 
scholars and activists is the use of reservations by treaty parties to 
alter their obligations arising under treaties.109  Reservations permit 
States to join multilateral human rights treaties while undertaking 
only those obligations they wish to undertake.  While reservations 
help increase the number of parties to a human rights treaty,110 
                                                     
108 Thomas Fuller and Abraham Sofaer have argued that when States comply 
with TMB pronouncements they implicitly consent to their lawmaking role.  See 
Thomas C. Fuller & Abraham D. Sofaer, Sovereignty: The Practioners’ Perspective, in 
PROBLEMATIC SOVEREIGNTY: CONTESTED RULES AND POLITICAL POSSIBILITIES 24, 38–39 
(Stephen D. Krasner ed., 2001) (arguing that a State’s decision to comply 
constitutes consent to the obligation).  It is generally the case that States retain 
control over whether to comply with treaty obligations, whether through non-
compliance or treaty-exit.  But it is important not to conflate the prerogative of 
compliance with the right to determine the content of international legal 
obligations.  The former permits noncompliance with international law only with 
the stain of law breaking, while the latter avoids that stigma.  
109 See, e.g., Kenneth Roth, The Charade of US Ratification of International Human 
Rights Treaties, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 347, 351–352 (2000) (accusing the United States of 
abusing the use of reservations to avoid providing its people the protections of the 
ICCPR); William A. Schabas, Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 79, 79–80 (1997) (criticizing reservations to CEDAW 
that in effect rob the provisions of practical meaning). 
110 See Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, at 24 (May 28) (stating 
that increasing the number of adherents to the Genocide Convention is one of its 
purposes). 
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they also incur several burdens of the consent principle identified 
in Part 1.2. 
Reservations contribute to the ‘thin slice of Swiss cheese’ nature 
of human rights regulation.  States or groups of States use 
reservations to exclude applicability of particular treaty provisions 
from their territory and jurisdiction, thereby creating geographic 
holes in treaty application.  States also use reservations to modify 
the content of treaty provisions in order to maximize flexibility for 
State compliance.  Doing so ‘thins’ out the norms, as it allows a 
wide-range of compliant conduct.  In so doing, reservations 
undermine the general premise of ‘universal’ human rights, 
turning them instead into an a la carte menu. 
As described in Part 1.1., States are limited in the reservations 
they may employ, however, as they must be consistent with the 
“object and purpose” of the treaty.111  But in reality, this rule fails 
to provide a meaningful restraint on reservations to multilateral 
human rights treaties.  States rarely police the reservations of other 
States to human rights treaties because they are of limited interest 
to other States.  When they do, the remedy is for the provision or 
the treaty itself to not enter into force between the reserving State 
and objecting State.112  Because the obligations within the treaty are 
not reciprocal, the reserving State suffers no tangible harm if the 
provision or treaty is not in force between it and the objecting 
State. Meanwhile the people of the reserving State remain without 
the protection of the treaty provision as drafted. 
Frustrated with the impact of reservations, the HRC announced 
in General Comment 24 that where reservations are inconsistent 
with the object and purpose of the treaty, it would sever the 
reservation and hold the State to the original treaty provision 
without the reservation.113 
                                                     
111 Id. at 29. 
112 See VCLT, supra note 19, at art 20(4)(b) (“An objection by another 
contracting State to a reservation does not preclude the entry into force of the 
treaty as between the objecting and reserving States unless a contrary intention is 
definitely expressed by the objecting State . . . .”); id. at art. 21(3) (“When a State 
objecting to a reservation has not opposed the entry into force of the treaty 
between itself and the reserving State, the provisions to which the reservation 
relates do not apply as between the two States to the extent of the reservation.”). 
113 U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 24 (52), supra note 11, 
¶ 18. 
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The result is a weaker consent principle.  Consider the 
experience of Trinidad & Tobago with respect to its reservations to 
the Optional Protocol (OP) to the ICCPR.  The OP grants the HRC 
jurisdiction to hear complaints regarding alleged State violations of 
the ICCPR.  Trinidad & Tobago joined the OP with a reservation 
denying the HRC jurisdiction over petitions by death row 
prisoners.114  When a death row prisoner brought a claim to the 
HRC alleging a violation of the ICCPR, the HRC heard the claim 
despite the reservation.115  The HRC found that the reservation 
violated the object and purpose of the treaty, and was invalid and 
severed.116  The result is that the HRC exercised jurisdiction over 
petitions by death row prisoners despite Trinidad & Tobago’s lack 
of consent to it doing so. 
From a traditional sovereignty perspective, this outcome is 
worrisome as it results in a State being bound to an obligation to 
which it did not consent.117  But if the protection of human rights is 
                                                     
114 See Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations 
Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 
COLUM. L. REV. 1832, 1871–81 (2002) (providing a detailed history of the reasons for 
Trinidad & Tobago’s reservation to the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR). 
115 See Kennedy v. Trin. & Tobago, Commc’n No. 845/1999, ¶ 6.7, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/67/D/845/1999 (U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. Dec. 31, 1999) (finding the 
reservation was inconsistent with the object and purpose of the ICCPR because it 
singled out a discrete group for reduced procedural protections for human rights). 
116 Id. 
117 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and 
Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 436–37 (2000) (arguing severability is 
inconsistent with State consent).  
  Ryan Goodman makes the admittedly counterintuitive argument that a 
rebuttable presumption in favor of severance actually better protects consent 
because of the costs of requiring States to re-ratify treaties with invalid 
reservations.  Ryan Goodman, Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Reservations, and State 
Consent, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 531, 536–37 (2002).   
  Goodman’s argument depends upon two assumptions that are more 
protective of consent than the approach of the HRC.  First, Goodman argues that 
the touchstone for the rebuttable presumption is whether the State intended the 
reservation to be an essential condition of ratification.  Id. at 536.  The HRC makes 
no such inquiry.  Second, Goodman assumes States can exit from a treaty if the 
presumption is applied incorrectly.  Id. at 556.  By contrast, the HRC views exit 
from the ICCPR as impermissible.  See U.N. Human Rights Comm., General 
Comment No. 26 (61): General Comment on Issues Relating to the Continuity of 
Obligations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 61st Sess., 
Oct. 29, 1997, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.8/Rev.1 (Dec. 8, 1997) 
(“The Committee is therefore firmly of the view that international law does not 
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the measuring stick, then the HRC approach makes much more 
sense.  It reduces the ability of States to employ invalid 
reservations—which harm core human rights equities—while 
preserving the protections of the treaty more generally. 
2.3. Critiques 
These developments in human rights practice have been 
criticized for inappropriately moving away from State sovereignty 
as the foundational principle of international law.  If sovereignty, 
and not human rights, remains the guiding principle of all 
international law including human rights, then efforts to constrict 
the consent principle are inappropriate. 
The United States has frequently asserted such a position.  
During its 2006 presentation regarding U.S. compliance with the 
ICCPR, a U.S. official informed the HRC that “[i]t was not for the 
Committee to change his country’s obligations flowing from the 
Covenant or to issue authoritative guidance in that respect.”118  
Consistent with this statement, the United States rejects 
recommendations from TMB that create unintended obligations for 
the United States because lawmaking is outside the mandate of 
TMB.119  Other States, including France120 and the Netherlands,121 
have criticized TMB in similar terms. 
                                                     
permit a State which has ratified or acceded or succeeded to the Covenant to 
denounce it or withdraw from it.”). 
118 U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Under Article 40 of 
the Covenant: Second and Third Periodic Reports of the United States of America, 
87th Sess., July 18, 2007, ¶ 105, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.2380 (July 27, 2006). 
119 For example, the Committee against Torture interpreted the Convention 
Against Torture’s prohibition on cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment as 
requiring closure of the U.S. detention facility at Guantanamo Bay.  U.N. Comm. 
Against Torture, Considerations of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under 
Article 19 of the Convention: Conclusions and Recommendations of the 
Committee Against Torture, 36th Sess., May 1–19, 2006, ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. 
CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (July 25, 2006).  The then-Legal Adviser to the U.S. 
Department of State, John Bellinger, responded by rejecting the authority of the 
Committee Against Torture to make such a recommendation.  See Colum Lynch, 
Military Prison’s Closure Is Urged; U.N. Panel Faults Detention Policies, WASH. POST, 
May 20, 2006, at A1 (quoting Bellinger stating recommendation is “skewed and 
reaches well beyond the scope and mandate of the committee”). 
120 See Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., Observations of States Parties 
Under Article 40, Paragraph 5, of the Covenant ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. A/51/40; GAOR, 
51st Sess., Supp. No. 40 (1996) (“France points out that the Committee, like any 
other treaty body or similar body established by agreement, owes its existence 
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A small number of American scholars have backed this 
position.122  These scholars argue that many liberal positions 
favored by academics and NGOs, but rejected by the U.S. 
government, are repackaged as human rights obligations in order 
to win otherwise lost battles.123  Under this account, international 
human rights law seeks to strip legislative and judicial power away 
from Congress and the federal courts124 and place them instead in 
the hands of NGOs and the global elite. 
John Bolton makes this argument in the context of the duty to 
prosecute.  Bolton challenges the proposition that a duty to 
prosecute is positive for human rights, viewing this effort at 
geographic gap filling as an effort to impose the “value 
preferences” of academics and activists on unsuspecting States.125  
He instead favors leaving the decision to undertake such an 
international duty in State hands.126  Bolton explains that such 
decisions go to the heart of “national autonomy” properly 
protected by State sovereignty, and fears that efforts to undermine 
                                                     
exclusively to the treaty, and has no powers other than those conferred on it by 
the States parties . . . .”). 
121 See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by 
States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Replies of the Government of the 
Netherlands to the Concerns Expressed by the Human Rights Committee in its 
Concluding Observations, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/72/NET/Add.1 (Apr. 29, 
2003) (rejecting Committee’s reading of the ICCPR conferring certain 
responsibilities to the Netherlands over Srebrenica). 
122 See, e.g., John R. Bolton, Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?, 1 CHI. 
J. INT’L L. 205, 212–15 (2000) (describing plot by human rights advocates to 
undermine U.S. sovereignty). 
123 See id. at 213–14 (citing opposition to the U.S. death penalty as an example 
of this phenomenon). 
124 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural 
Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1567–82 (2003) (raising 
concerns about delegation of decision making to international institutions); Jack 
Goldsmith, Should International Human Rights Law Trump US Domestic Law?, 1 CHI. 
J. INT’L L. 327, 333 (2000) (describing sovereignty-based concerns about looking to 
the writings of “legal academics, human rights activists, and international 
institutions” in interpreting human rights norms); Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of 
Federal Power to International Organizations: New Problems with Old Solutions, 85 
MINN. L. REV. 71, 72–73 (2000) (explaining constitutional concerns of international 
delegation). 
125 Bolton, supra note 122, at 213. 
126 See id. (highlighting the case of General Augusto Pinochet as a situation 
with “compelling arguments” in support of the state, here Chile, having sole 
decisionmaking authority over whether or not to prosecute). 
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that autonomy are part of efforts to bring the United States and 
other States to the heel of the “globalist” agenda.127 
Other critics view sovereignty as a protection for developing 
States and their cultures.  These critics argue that human rights are 
often the culturally contingent preferences of the internationally 
powerful imposed on the weak.128  If so, State sovereignty is a 
potential bulwark against imposing the values of particular States 
or social groups on dissenting cultures.129 
This criticism is most trenchant when made by developing 
world critics who view consent as a protection for weaker States 
from the moral imperialism of Western Europe and the United 
States.130  The consent principle ensures that the developing 
world’s values are included within the human rights corpus, 
essential if human rights are to be truly global.131 
 Makau Mutua, for example, describes a “savages-victims-
saviors” metaphor at the core of human rights law, in which 
Western actors demonize States with non-Western cultural 
foundations as savages for victimizing their own population.132  
This metaphor, he contends, permits human rights law and its 
advocates to portray themselves as saviors, much as missionaries 
or colonialists once did.133  The result is a “Eurocentric ideal” of 
                                                     
127 See id. at 212–13 (examining elaborate “globalist” conspiracy to undermine 
sovereign prerogative). 
128 See, e.g., MAKAU MUTUA, HUMAN RIGHTS: A POLITICAL AND CULTURAL 
CRITIQUE 10 (2002) (categorizing Western authors’ characterization of the universal 
human rights movement as “a black-and-white construction that pits good against 
evil”); Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1190 
(2007) (“[T]he presumed universal may also be the hegemonic.”); Weil, supra note 
71, at 441 (describing nonconsensual formation of customary norms as 
transferring lawmaking authority to a “de facto oligarchy” of the international 
community). 
129 See MUTUA, supra note 128, at 108 (arguing that any right that is in conflict 
with self-determination should be void because of the need to protect weaker 
cultures from the “evangelization” of stronger cultures). 
130 See M.O. Chibundu, Making Customary International Law Through Municipal 
Adjudication: A Structural Inquiry, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 1069, 1139–40 (1999) (noting that 
human rights cases in U.S. court are like “a current affairs topics primer of the 
trouble-spots of the non-Western world”). 
131 See MUTUA, supra note 128, at 14 (arguing that resisting the current 
Eurocentric human rights model is essential to the future of human rights as a 
global movement). 
132 Id. at 10–12. 
133 Id.  
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human rights that lacks legitimacy in the developing world.134  
Consistent with this view, Mutua extols consent as a sacrosanct 
protection from Western domination.135 
Other scholars defend consent as a tool to secure State 
compliance with human rights norms.  International human rights 
law largely depends on voluntary compliance because of the 
general absence of coercive enforcement mechanisms.136  While, in 
other areas of international law, States may use their full range of 
diplomatic and economic tools to enforce international 
commitments, violation by one State of its human rights 
commitments is of little interest to other States.137  Thus, States are 
largely left to self-comply with human rights obligations. 
Given the dependence on self-compliance, diminishing the role 
of consent in lawmaking may increase the risk of noncompliance.138  
States are likely to be less willing to comply voluntarily with legal 
obligations to which they never agreed.  If the goal of human rights 
law is to change State behavior, then it is pointless to create rules 
that States have no intention of following. 
Thus, scholars have raised important reasons why the 
protection of human rights may be aided, or at least not hindered, 
by the consent principle.  Consent aids both in the determination of 
what constitutes a human right and in the enforcement of such 
                                                     
134 Id. at 12. 
135 See id. at 108 (“[T]he most fundamental of all human rights is that of self-
determination and . . . no other right overrides it.”). 
136 LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 235 (2d ed. 
1979) (“The forces that induce compliance with other law . . . do not pertain 
equally to the law of human rights.”).  
137 See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and 
International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 629 (2004) (noting that 
externalities from human rights violations, such as massive refugee flows, are 
sporadic and localized). 
138 There are different theories offered as to why this might be so.  See JACK L. 
GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 10–14 (2005) 
(offering an explanation from a rationalist perspective); Laurence R. Helfer, 
Nonconsensual International Lawmaking, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 119–21 (2008) 
(offering an explanation from realist, liberal and expressive perspectives). 
  Scholars have chronicled systematic noncompliance to human rights treaty 
obligations.  See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a 
Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1940 (2002) (describing violations of human rights 
treaties as “common”).  Studies of this sort raise a question about the extent to 
which consent is an accurate proxy for compliance under any circumstances. 
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rights.  But these arguments have important limits on their 
effectiveness. 
Though the risk of moral imperialism is one that gives human 
rights practitioners and scholars pause, at the core of the human 
rights movement is the belief that there are universal human 
rights.  Once one is convinced that man has identified such a right, 
hand wringing about consent risks the appearance of moral 
relativism that is routinely dismissed within human rights 
scholarship.139 
Similarly, the argument that consent is important for 
compliance smacks of apologism for State power, which is in 
significant tension with human rights.  If in fact a human right 
exists, then the fact that many States will not carry out that right is 
not an argument against recognizing it.  To this end, Andrew 
Guzman directly challenges the argument that compliance is a 
relevant metric by which to evaluate the content of rights.140  He 
contends that even if a small number of States alter their behavior 
to comply with a right, while acknowledging that most do not, 
human rights nevertheless benefits.141 
Instead, the place of consent within the human rights corpus 
will be more secure if human rights benefits to consent are 
identified that do not depend on questioning the universality of 
rights or apologizing for State power.  Part 3 develops such an 
argument. 
3. CONSENT AND SELF-DETERMINATION 
Part 1 described the human rights consent problem.  The 
consent principle, rooted in protection of States’ rights, raises 
concerns from the perspective of the protection of human rights.  
These burdens have led to diminishment of the consent principle 
in human rights theory and practice.  Though there have been 
critics of this effort, they have failed to mount an effective 
challenge to the premise that a system oriented toward the 
                                                     
139 See MUTUA, supra note 128, at 34 (describing criticisms of his work on the 
grounds that he is a relativist). 
140 See generally Andrew T. Guzman, Against Consent, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 747 
(2012). 
141 Id. at 752–53 (arguing that the existence of the proper rules is more 
important than the level of consent or compliance). 
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protection of human rights ought to reduce the scope of the 
consent principle. 
This Part argues the consent principle is essential to the 
exercise of the collective human right of self-determination.  It has 
two objectives.  First, it describes the contours of the human right 
of self-determination, including an explanation of the values 
protected by that right.  Second, it links the consent principle to 
self-determination. 
3.1. Human Right of Self-Determination 
The collective human right to self-determination emerges from 
the intrinsic value of self-government to actualization of human 
potential.  Members of a community share experiences and 
cooperate together such that over time they create a common life.  
That life has value to its members separate and apart from the 
instrumental benefits they receive from the community.142  This 
insight is at the heart of “culture,” which people value intrinsically 
because it provides a sense of belonging to a community with 
shared attributes and a framework through which to enjoy 
individual rights.143 
Self-governing communities place inherent value on exercising 
control over their own political, economic, social and cultural 
development.144  Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz explain that 
membership in communities is an aspect of human personality, 
and therefore well-being, which requires the opportunity to 
express membership.145  A primary method for doing so is 
                                                     
142 See MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH 
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 51–63 (1977) (detailing the collective aspect of human 
rights). 
143 See ALLEN BUCHANAN, SECESSION: THE MORALITY OF POLITICAL DIVORCE 
FROM FORT SUMTER TO LITHUANIA AND QUEBEC 79 (1991) (describing culture as “the 
way of life with which its members identify and which gives meaning to their 
pursuits and projects” and noting that part of participating in a culture is to 
“adopt the perspective of ‘our’ interests rather than ‘my’ interests”). 
144 See MICHLA POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN LAW AND PRACTICE: THE 
NEW DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED NATIONS 2 (1982) (noting the origin of self-
determination as recognition of the nation as “a community of organization, of 
life, and of tradition”) (internal quotations omitted). 
145 See Avishai Margalit & Joseph Raz, National Self-Determination, 87 J. PHIL. 
439, 440 (Sept. 1990) (explaining the value in self-government as “the value of 
entrusting the general political power over a group and its members to the 
group”). 
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participation in the public life of the community, including 
through political activity.  Self-government is requisite for such 
activity to be meaningful. 
Self-government requires protection from external intervention 
into local decision-making.  External intervention can unduly 
influence or override local decisions, thereby undermining the 
promise of self-government.146 
International law actualizes this philosophical insight through 
the collective right to self-determination.  Consistent with its 
privileging of the State as its primary unit of measurement,147 
international law recognizes the people of a State as a community 
that enjoys the right of self-government.148  The people of the State 
are sovereign, and provide the government its powers through 
their consent to be governed.149  They must be able to direct their 
development, free from external intervention, in order to realize 
the promise of self-government. 
This concept first bloomed as a principle in response to 
colonialism and foreign occupation, which deprive communities of 
their opportunity to self-govern.150  The U.N. Charter includes self-
                                                     
146 See WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF 
MINORITY RIGHTS 35–36 (1995) (distinguishing external and internal elements of 
collective rights). 
147 The State is the unit recognized in international law as responsible for 
representation of its peoples’ interests on the international plane.  It was for this 
reason that colonized peoples were presumed to be able to exercise self-
determination only by forming their own State, free from the oppression of their 
colonial masters.  See ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL 
REAPPRAISAL 71–89 (1995) (detailing the practice related to external self-
determination). 
148 See Michael Walzer, The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics, 
9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 209, 210 (1980) (describing States as “presumptively . . . the 
arena” in which self-determination is exercised). 
149 See Mortimer Sellers, Republican Principles in International Law, 11 CONN. J. 
INT’L L. 403, 407–08 (1996) (describing the influence of the American revolution on 
self-determination). 
150 During the pre-World War II period, a small number of influential 
political leaders advocated for self-determination as a concept to guide 
international affairs.  See CASSESE, supra note 149, at 14–19 (explaining that Lenin’s 
view was that ethnic or national groups enjoy the right to choose their own 
sovereigns); Michla Pomerance, The United States and Self-Determination: 
Perspectives on the Wilsonian Conception, 70 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (1976) (describing 
Woodrow Wilson’s argument that every people have the right to choose the 
sovereignty under which they live).  Wilson’s ideals influenced the Versailles 
Treaty ending World War I, especially in setting the German-Danish border and 
freeing the Slavs in Czechoslovakia from Austro-Hungarian rule, but were 
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determination as a principle guiding the United Nations.151  This 
principle was invoked as the basis upon which newly decolonized 
territories could seek statehood if approved by its people through 
plebiscite.  This principle was used to support the decolonization 
of Africa and Asia; the struggle against racist regimes in South 
Africa and Rhodesia; and is invoked to support creation of an 
independent Palestinian State and as a basis for resolution of 
sovereignty over Kashmir.152 
Self-determination evolved into a collective human right in 
both Covenants that together serve as an international bill of 
rights.153  Both the ICCPR and ICESCR begin with an identical 
right:  “All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue 
of that right they freely determine their political status and freely 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”154  This 
right is the first human right found in the Covenants because 
                                                     
severely compromised in other areas.  Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to 
Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 46, 53 (1992).  However, self-
determination had relatively little purchase before World War II.  See Report of the 
Committee of International Jurists Entrusted by the Council of the League of Nations with 
the Task of Giving an Advisory Opinion upon the Legal Aspects of the Aaland Islands 
Question, OFFICIAL J. OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, Oct. 1920 (rejecting the existence 
of a right of self-determination that gave national groups the right to separate 
themselves from their existing State without consent). 
151 See U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2 (describing development of “friendly 
relations . . . based on respect for the principle of . . . self-determination of 
peoples” as a purpose of the United Nations).  
152 World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia 
and Related Intolerance, Aug. 31–Sept. 8, 2001,  Report of the World Conference 
Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (“Durban 
Declaration”), ¶ 63, at 18, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.189/12 (Jan. 25, 2002) (“We 
recognize the inalienable right of the Palestinian people to self-determination 
and to the establishment of an independent State.”); Interim Rep. of the U.N. 
Comm’n for India & Pakistan, ¶ 75, U.N. Doc. S/1100 (Nov. 9, 1948) (“The 
Government of India and the Government of Pakistan reaffirm their wish that the 
future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined in 
accordance with the will of the people . . . .”). 
153 One hundred sixty–seven (167) States are parties to the ICCPR and one 
hundred sixty (160) States are parties to the ICESCR, meaning that a commitment 
found in these treaties are legal obligations for the vast majority of States.  See 
generally ICCPR, supra note 12; ICESCR, supra note 12. 
154 ICCPR, supra note 12, at art. 1, para. 1; ICESCR, supra note 12, at art. 1, 
para. 1. 
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negotiators agreed that self-determination is a prerequisite for 
enjoyment of individual rights.155 
The text of the Covenants, their negotiating history, and 
subsequent practice show the human right to self-determination 
guarantees:  (1) the people as a whole in all countries and 
territories of the world;156 (2) a continuing and permanent right to 
(3) use the State to direct development free from external 
intervention. 
First, the Covenants are clear that the human right to self-
determination extends to peoples as a whole in all countries and 
territories.157  For example, the American people as a whole enjoy 
the right to self-determination.  The use of the word “all” in the 
text of the Covenant provisions provides textual support for this 
interpretation.  The negotiating history indicates it was used after 
the rejection of many phrases designed to limit the term to portions 
of a population,158 or to colonized peoples.159 
States have generally interpreted Article 1 to apply to the 
population of States as a whole.  When India ratified the ICCPR 
                                                     
155 China, Lebanon, Poland, and Yugoslavia, among other States gave 
precedence to self-determination.  MARC J. BOSSUYT, GUIDE TO THE “TRAVAUX 
PRÉPARATOIRES” OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 
20–21 (1987).  See also NOWAK, supra note 82, at 13 (describing firm rejection by 
negotiating parties of the view that self-determination is not a human right).  This 
view prevailed over Western concerns that self-determination was insufficiently 
clear to be defined as a human right.  BOSSUYT, supra note 157, at 20 (chronicling 
the negative comments of Australia, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Sweden). 
156 In addition to the people of a sovereign nation as a whole, Article 1 also 
includes within its ambit significant national or ethnic groups within a 
multinational State.  Such peoples are in contrast to ethnic, linguistic, and 
religious minorities who were granted separate protection by Article 27 of the 
ICCPR, and were apparently excluded from Article 1 protection. See CASSESE, 
supra note 147, at 61 (noting that the word “peoples” would have been excluded 
from the text had it not been for the “clear understanding that it was not intended 
to refer to minorities”).  The difference between minorities and sub-national 
peoples is slippery and not well developed in the ICCPR negotiating history or 
practice.  NOWAK, supra note 82, at 20–22.  
157 Louise Doswald-Beck, The Legal Validity of Military Intervention by 
Invitation of the Government, 56 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 189, 201–03 (1986). 
158 States rejected qualifiers like “large compact national groups,” “ethnic, 
religious or linguistic minorities,” and “racial units inhabiting well-defined 
territories” because it was believed that people should be understood in a 
“general” sense.  G. A. Res. 10 (II), ¶ 9, at 14, U.N. Doc. A/2929 (July 1, 1955). 
159 The Soviet Union led the effort to limit the right of self-determination to 
people living under colonial rule or foreign occupation, but was rebuffed by the 
other negotiating States.  CASSESE, supra note 147, at 49. 
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and the ICESCR, it entered a declaration stating that Article 1 
extends only to “peoples under foreign domination,” and not “to 
sovereign independent nations or to a section of a people or a 
nation.”160  India felt compelled to make such a declaration because 
it was concerned that the phrase “all peoples” is generally 
interpreted to include the people as a whole of sovereign States.161  
France, West Germany, and the Netherlands confirmed India’s fear 
by raising objections to the Indian declaration on grounds it was an 
invalid reservation, indicating their deep disagreement with 
India’s interpretation of the provision.162 
The HRC also interprets the right of self-determination to 
extend to the people as a whole of a sovereign State.  It rejects 
reservations to Article 1(1) that restrict the scope of protection to 
extend to anything less than the people as a whole of the State.163  
The HRC admonished Azerbaijan when it asserted that Article 1(1) 
extended protection only to former colonies.  The HRC stated it 
“regretted” this position, noting its view that the ICCPR 
guarantees the right of self-determination to “all peoples and not 
merely to colonized peoples.”164  
Anne Peters challenges the claim that self-determination is a 
right owed collectively to the people of a State, arguing it is better 
                                                     
160 See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. 
TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg_no 
=IV-3&chapter=4&lang=en#EndDec (last visited July 25, 2012) (“India declares 
that the words ‘the right of self-determination’ appearing in [this article] apply 
only to the peoples under foreign domination and that these words do not apply 
to sovereign independent States or to a section of a people or nation—which is the 
essence of national integrity.”). 
161 See CASSESE, supra note 147, at 60 (characterizing Indian declaration as a 
reservation). 
162 See U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, supra note 160 (listing objections to 
declarations and reservations). 
163 U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 24 (52), supra note 11, 
¶ 9.   
164 Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., ¶ 296, U.N. Doc. A/49/40; GAOR, 49th 
Sess., Supp. No. 40 (Vol. II) (1994).  It also appears that Azerbaijan’s concern was 
with respect to Article 1 extending rights to minority groups, not to the 
Azerbaijani people as a whole.  See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of 
Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant:  Initial 
Reports of States Parties due in 1993: Azerbaijan, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/81/Add.2 (Mar. 8, 1994) (raising concerns about “micronationalism” 
and claims of “regional groupings within States”).    
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conceived of as an individual right.165  While she acknowledges 
that the “technical” rights-holders with self-determination are 
“peoples,” she dismisses the argument that the right is intended to 
be held by a collective.166  Peters argues that the concept of 
“peoples” is arbitrary, given the difficulty in distinguishing 
between peoples and minorities.167  To attribute legal significance 
to an arbitrary grouping makes little sense.  She also questions 
whether the Covenants—otherwise filled with individual rights—
would begin with a collective right.168  Instead, Peters claims that 
self-determination protects an individual’s right to determine his 
or her fate, in and through the community.169 
Peters’ approach is inconsistent with the negotiating history 
and State practice surrounding the provision as just described.  The 
HRC has specifically rejected this view, concluding it cannot hear 
claims through its communications procedures for violations of 
Article 1(1) because its jurisdiction is limited to individual rights, 
and Article 1(1) protects collective rights.170 
Moreover, the collective privileged by the Covenants—the 
people of a sovereign State—is not arbitrary given that 
international law has a history of prioritizing the State as the 
                                                     
165  Peters, supra note 34, at 541.  Such a view is consistent with scholars who 
claim there is generally no room in liberal human rights theory for collective 
rights.  Tesón, for example, argues that collective rights—which cannot be 
reduced to a collection of individual rights—are social policies masquerading as 
rights.  TESÓN, supra note 34, at 133.  Such a deception is undertaken for rhetorical 
purposes, he argues, as it strengthens the rhetorical appeal of the social policy.  
See id. at 136–37 (opposing granting social policies the rhetorical weight accorded 
to individual rights). 
  Such criticism fails to account for the presence of collective rights in most 
international and domestic rights instruments.  See BUCHANAN, supra note 34, at 77 
(describing aspects of freedom of association and federalism as by definition 
collective rights).  It also attributes a false clarity to a dichotomy between 
individual and collective rights.  See id. at 77–79.  Individual rights can often be 
justified in collective terms and vice-versa.  Id.  Insisting that collective rights be 
described in individual terms, as Peters does with self-determination, obscures an 
important attribute of the right. 
166 Peters, supra note 34, at 541. 
167 Id.  
168 Id.  
169 Id. 
170 See A. B. v. It., Commc’n No. 413/1990, ¶¶ 3.2, 4, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/40/D/413/1990 (U.N. Human Rights Comm. Nov. 2, 1990) (rejecting 
individual claims for violation of Article 1(1)); Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., 
¶¶ 401–02, U.N. Doc. A/42/40; GAOR, 42d Sess., Supp. No. 40 (1987) (same).  
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relevant unit of measurement.  Self-determination is premised on 
the idea that the people of the State are sovereign within the State, 
thus making the people of the State an appropriate collective to 
exercise the right.  Though, as Peters suggests, the concept of 
“peoples” becomes more complicated in multi-ethnic States,171 this 
problem at the margins does not undermine the validity of “the 
people” as a whole of the State as a collective rights-holding entity. 
More fundamentally, Peters’ approach ignores the normative 
value attached to belonging to a self-governing community with 
the capacity to direct development as it sees fit separate and apart 
from the instrumental individual benefits that such a community 
confers.  The human experience values culture and community as 
intrinsically valuable and, in the process, develops a sense of 
shared interests separate and apart from individual interests.172  
Thus, to describe self-determination in individual terms is to miss a 
significant portion of what the right describes.173 
Second, the right to self-determination enjoyed by all peoples is 
continuing and permanent and not extinguished by statehood.  
The original draft text of the ICCPR prepared by the Human Rights 
Commission stated that “[a]ll peoples . . . shall have the right of 
self-determination.”174  The “shall” was dropped during the U.N. 
negotiations of the provisions.175  The chairman of the U.N. 
Committee assigned to negotiate the text explained to the larger 
group of States that this change was designed to emphasize that 
the right was permanent, and not extinguished with statehood.176 
                                                     
171 Peters, supra note 34, at 541. 
172 See BUCHANAN, supra note 34, at 79 (arguing against reducing collective 
rights solely to the instrumental benefits they confer to individuals). 
173 Even under Peters’ approach, consent is relevant to the protection of self-
determination.  Under Peters’ analysis individuals possess the right to participate 
in the public life of the State “to determine their fate in and through the 
community.”  Peters, supra note 34, at 541.  Diminishing the consent principle in 
human rights lawmaking constricts an individual’s right to determine one’s fate 
through the community, because it reduces the extent to which the community 
controls matters important to the human experience.  The individual’s right to 
determine his or her fate through the community is diluted by a decrease in 
community powers.  This cost to individual rights is not currently considered a 
factor in evaluating proposals that diminish consent either.  
174 See G.A. Res. 10 (II), supra note 158, at 13 (providing original draft text). 
175 CASSESE, supra note 147, at 54. 
176 See id. (quoting the Chairman of the Third Committee Working Group). 
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Reporting on Article 1 by State parties to the ICCPR and the 
ICESCR confirms that States understand the Article 1 requirement 
as continuing.  The HRC in General Comment 12 wrote that, while 
States were always including Article 1 within their reports on 
compliance with the treaty, they were too often limiting that 
information to election laws.177  Instead, the HRC asked States to 
provide information on the “constitutional and political processes 
which in practice allow the exercise of this right.”178  Consistent 
with this request, even established States long since removed from 
colonialism report on measures they have taken to comply with 
Article 1.179 
Third, this continuous right enjoyed by all peoples entitles 
them to use the political institutions of the State to direct 
development without external intervention.  Such a right emerges 
from the face of the text granting peoples the right to “freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development.”180 
The negotiating history of the provision indicates that States 
wanted to enshrine a “very comprehensive conception of the right 
of self-determination.”181  To that end, the world’s peoples are free 
to “establish its own political institutions, to develop its own 
economic resources, and to direct its own social and cultural 
evolution, without the interference of other peoples or nations.”182 
                                                     
177 Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., General Comment 12 (21): Article 1, 
21st Sess., ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/39/40; GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 40 (1984). 
178 Id. ¶ 4. 
179 See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted 
by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Third Periodical Reports of 
States Parties Due in 1993: Peru, ¶¶ 5–8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/83/Add.1 (Mar. 21, 
1995) (describing how Peru satisfied Article 1 through establishment of a 
republican form of government allowing for democratic participation by all of its 
citizens). 
180 ICCPR, supra note 12, at art. 1, para 1; ICESCR, supra note 12, at art. 1, 
para. 1. 
181 G.A. Res. 10 (II), supra note 158, at ch. IV, ¶ 12.  This broad conception of 
self-determination even provoked concerns that it would lead to discrimination 
against foreigners within the State, although Parties were confident other 
provisions in the Covenants prevented such an outcome.  See id. at ch. IV, ¶ 13 
(noting worries that it would prompt “burning of foreign books and the 
confiscation of foreign investments”). 
182 Id. 
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The HRC hewed to this broad interpretation in General 
Comment 12.183  There, the HRC admonished, “States must refrain 
from interfering in the internal affairs of other States and thereby 
adversely affecting the exercise of the right to self-
determination.”184  This link between self-determination and non-
intervention has been repeated in resolutions of the General 
Assembly185 and by the ICJ.186 
There are good reasons to believe that States view this three-
part understanding of self-determination as customary.187  Most 
States of the world have accepted the collective right to self-
determination as a treaty obligation by joining either or both of the 
Covenants.188  Moreover, the three-part formulation described here 
is repeated in numerous international agreements and resolutions 
of international organizations.189 
                                                     
183 Antonio Cassese employs a similar interpretation of this term in his 
treatise on self-determination.  Cassese explains that Article 1(1) protects a State’s 
political institutions from outside interference, in particular, reinforcing the 
customary prohibitions on interference with the political independence and 
territorial integrity of another State.  CASSESE, supra note 147, at 55. 
184 Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., General Comment 12 (21), supra note 
177, ¶ 6. 
185 See Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic 
Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. 
Res. 2131 (XX), ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2131 (Dec. 21, 1965) (“Every State has an 
inalienable right to choose its political, economic, social and cultural systems, 
without interference in any form by another State.”); see also Jean Salmon, Internal 
Aspects of the Right to Self-Determination, in MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 
253, 258 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1993) (describing self-determination and non-
intervention as “two sides of the same coin”). 
186 Nicaragua Case, supra note 8, ¶ 205 (condemning interference in the choice 
of political, economic, social and cultural systems). 
187 Self-determination is often described as a jus cogens norm.  See, e.g., JAMES 
CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 101 (2d ed. 2006) 
(including self-determination within the list of peremptory norms).  However, it 
appears that only the application of self-determination to colonized peoples 
achieves this lofty status.  See, e.g., Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, The Right to Self-
Determination: Implementation of United Nations Resolutions, ¶ 70, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/405/Rev.1 (1980) (by Héctor Gros Espiell) (arguing self-
determination is peremptory in its anti-colonial form). 
188 See ICCPR, supra note 12, at art. 1, para 1 (“All peoples have the right of 
self-determination.”); ICESCR, supra note 12, at art. 1, para. 1 (containing the same 
right). 
189 See, e.g., Organization of the African Union, African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, art. 20, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (Jun. 27, 
1981) (“[All peoples] shall freely determine their political status and shall pursue 
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This Article does not, however, undertake the potentially 
painstaking task of proving it is so.  Nevertheless, most States of 
the world have accepted self-determination as a binding obligation 
through ratification of one or the other of the Covenants.190  The 
text of these treaties and the practice thereunder demonstrates that 
the people as a whole of a State have a collective continuing right 
to self-direct development free from external intervention. 
3.2. Self-Determination and Consent 
The consent principle is essential to the realization of the 
collective right to self-determination.  The link between self-
determination, and consent to human rights obligations, stems 
from the relationship between political, economic, social, and 
cultural development, and human rights.  Part of directing 
development involves deciding which international human rights 
obligations to accept because these obligations set the conditions 
within which development will occur.191  For example, the decision 
whether or not to permit women to choose abortions impacts 
issues as diverse as the role of religion within society, women’s 
health, and women in the workplace.  Similarly, the decision of a 
transitional society on whether to prosecute those who committed 
serious international crimes influences the distribution of political 
power, development of the rule of law and domestic legal 
structures, and the economic well-being of victims and victims’ 
families. 
                                                     
their economic and social development according to the policy they have freely 
chosen.”); Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE] Final Act, at 
7 (Aug. 1, 1975), available at http://www.osce.org/mc/39501?download=true 
(“By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all 
peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they 
wish, their internal and external political status, without external interference, and 
to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social and cultural 
development.”); Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), at 123, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625 (XXV)  
(Oct. 24, 1970) (“[A]ll peoples have the right freely to determine, without external 
interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development. . . .”). 
190 See supra note 188 and accompanying text (identifying the right of self-
determination in the Covenants).  
191 See Crawford, supra note 14, at 121 (claiming a heightened interest for 
popular participation on human rights questions given their impact on the 
internal life of the State). 
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It is through the State that the people of a State communicate 
the decision on whether to undertake international human rights 
obligations to other States and international actors.192  The act of 
consent is a manifestation of self-determination because it 
represents the people’s decision on whether and how to condition 
development with international commitments.  Self-determination 
mandates that other States and the international community 
respect this decision in order to permit the people to develop its 
society ‘freely.’ 
This value for the consent principle is different from the values 
attributed to consent by the conventional theories described in Part 
1.  Specifically, the link between consent and self-determination 
locates a value for consent that is neither sovereigntist, nor 
relativist, nor apologist. 
The traditional understanding of consent roots its value in 
States’ rights, a sovereigntist conception that is challenged by the 
idea that humans, not States, are the core protected entities in 
international human rights law.193  By contrast, the link between 
consent and self-determination demonstrates that consent is 
valuable because of the ability it gives humans to participate 
meaningfully in self-directing the development of their State.  Its 
value is intrinsic to human rights, not extrinsic. 
Consent has also been valued by some scholars for providing 
different cultures, especially subordinate developing cultures, the 
opportunity to have their voices heard in the development of 
human rights.194  Consent respects the different conceptions of 
human rights that exist globally.  This argument is potentially 
relativist in nature; consent protects pluralism in a world in which 
there is no right answer to what human rights law should require.   
By contrast, the relationship between consent and self-
determination posits nothing about whether different cultures do 
or do not agree about the content of rights, or whether there is a 
right answer to what human rights law ought to require.  Rather, 
humans value participating in communities that decide rights 
                                                     
192 See id. at 129 (explaining that international law has traditionally viewed 
the established government of a State as the voice for all its people).  
193 See supra Sections 2.1 and 2.2 (describing the traditional consent principle 
and human rights challenges to consent). 
194 See supra note 129 and accompanying text (discussing Mutua’s view of the 
necessity of self-determination to protect weaker cultures). 
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questions for themselves, free from external intervention.  Whether 
they ultimately arrive at the same substantive decision as other 
communities is revealing as to the existence of a genuine global 
consensus on the content of rights.  
Lastly, consent is praised by some scholars for promoting State 
compliance with human rights norms, which is ultimately the goal 
of human rights law.195  But letting the desire for State compliance 
to drive the content of rights is an apologist position because it 
conforms the law to State power.  Valuing consent for its 
relationship to self-determination is not apologist.  Consent 
matters, not because States are powerful, but because the people 
within States value participation in self-directing communities, free 
from external intervention. 
While consent is necessary for the protection of self-
determination, it is not sufficient to protect self-determination.  As 
with any group right, there is the risk that the individuals 
exercising that right on behalf of the group act in ways that benefit 
themselves at the expense of the group.196  The extent to which a 
State represents its people varies significantly from State to State.197  
The government may not represent its people because of how it 
came to power or how it has behaved once it was in power.198  Or, 
the people of the State may not form a single community engaged 
in pursuit of a common life—a problem common in multi-ethnic 
States.  Historian Samuel Moyn argues that it was disillusionment 
with the ability of States to satisfy self-determination that, in part, 
                                                     
195 See, e.g., Helfer, supra note 138, at 73 (claiming a role for consent in 
promoting compliance with international law). 
196 See BUCHANAN, supra note 143, at 78 (“[G]roup rights encourage hierarchy 
and create the possibility of opposition between the interests of those who control 
the exercise of the right and the interests of other members of the group.”). 
197 See, e.g., MUTUA, supra note 128, at 90 (noting that African States act 
inconsistently with the rights of their people in order “to maintain their personal 
privileges and retain power.”); Phillip R. Trimble, Globalization, International 
Institutions, and the Erosion of National Sovereignty and Democracy, 95 MICH. L. REV. 
1944, 1966 (1996–97) (“[T]he idea that the governments of Burma, Nigeria, or 
Somalia speak for their people is patently false.”). 
198 This analysis is based upon a distinction developed by Fernando Tesón.  
See TESÓN, supra note 34, at 57 (distinguishing between vertical and horizontal 
illegitimacy in States). 
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spawned the desire for greater international regulation of human 
rights.199  
Even though States are not always representative of their 
people, there are at least two reasons why the relationship between 
consent and self-determination should nevertheless be privileged 
in human rights lawmaking.  First, any effort to diminish the 
consent principle in response to unrepresentative States will 
necessarily harm the self-determination of those within 
representative States.  This reality holds true because there is no 
agreed test on what constitutes a representative State. 
Some western States argue that self-determination mandates 
that governments provide their citizens with the civil and political 
rights needed to participate in the public life of the State.200  
Australia informed the HRC that it “interpreted self-determination 
as the matrix of civil, political and other rights required for the 
meaningful participation of citizens” in the public life of the 
State.201  Similar statements have been made to the U.N. Third 
Committee by Germany,202 the United Kingdom,203 and the United 
States.204 
The HRC, while not directly interpreting Article 1(1) of the 
ICCPR in this way, has argued that the “related . . . but distinct” 
                                                     
199 See SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY 118–19 
(2010) (arguing that human rights law emerged into its current form from 1970s 
due to disillusionment with previous utopian theories including self-
determination). 
200 Antonio Cassese identifies ICCPR rights that he believes are required to 
ensure participation in the public life of the State: freedom of expression; peaceful 
assembly; free association; and the right to vote.  CASSESE, supra note 147, at 53. 
201 Rep. of the U.N. Human Rights Comm., ¶ 428, U.N. Doc. A/43/40; 
GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp. No. 40 (1988). 
202 See U.N. Third Comm., Summary Record of the 4th Meeting, ¶ 47, U.N. 
Doc. A/C.3/37/SR.5; GAOR, 37th Sess. (1982) (arguing a nation has fully realized 
self-determination if “individual citizens could fully enjoy their fundamental 
rights and freedoms, such as freedom of speech, freedom of information, freedom 
of assembly and association as well as [travel rights]”). 
203 See Geoffrey Marston, Subjects of International Law-States-Self Determination, 
1984 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 430, 432 (contending that self-determination requires 
“rights to freedom of thought and expression; the rights of peaceful assembly and 
freedom of association; the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs, either 
directly or through freely chosen representatives; and the right to vote and be 
elected at genuine periodic elections”). 
204 See CASSESE, supra note 147, at 303 n.47 (quoting a 1972 statement by the 
U.S. delegate to the UN General Assembly’s Third Committee stating “[F]reedom 
of choice is indispensable to the exercise of the right of self-determination”). 
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Article 25(a) guarantees every citizen the right to participate in the 
public life of the State.205  It reads this provision of the ICCPR as 
requiring governments to permit their citizens to participate in 
government through freedom of expression, assembly, and 
association.206 
Some scholars build on this argument and claim there is an 
emerging right to democracy in international law.  Thomas Franck 
and James Crawford both locate a right to democracy based in part 
on the right to self-determination.  Franck defines this right as 
“free, fair and open participation in the democratic process of 
governance . . . .”207  Crawford argues that democracy requires the 
State to protect a range of rights, including freedom of expression 
and assembly.208 
Not surprisingly, many States reject the argument that 
democracy is a sine qua non of a representative State.  The General 
Assembly affirms that it is the “concern solely of peoples to 
determine methods and to establish institutions regarding the 
electoral process, as well as to determine the ways for its 
implementation according to their constitutional and national 
legislation.”209  States that are non-representative from a Western 
liberal perspective sometimes argue that their peoples chose to 
create a political system that, while different from liberal 
democracy, is nevertheless an acceptable exercise of self-
determination.210 
                                                     
205 U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment Adopted by the Human 
Rights Committee Under Article 40, Paragraph 4, of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights: General Comment No. 25 (57), 57th Sess., ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7 (Aug. 27, 1996). 
206 Id. ¶ 8. 
207 Franck, supra note 150, at 59. 
208 Crawford, supra note 14, at 116. 
209 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 45/151, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/151 (Dec. 18, 1990) 
(asserting that nations should respect the principles of national sovereignty in the 
election process). 
210 See Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., U.N. Doc. A/42/40, supra note 170, 
¶ 286 (explaining how the people of Zaire opted for “Mobutisme,” or a system 
without political parties organized under teachings of former President Mobutu); 
Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., ¶ 506, U.N. Doc A/46/40; GAOR, 46th Sess., 
Supp. No. 40 (1991) (describing Sudan’s argument that its people opted for 
government under Shariah law that cannot by definition provide all the civil and 
political rights found in the ICCPR). 
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There are reasons to be doubtful that human rights law can 
resolve this dispute.  A State will never agree that international law 
demands a standard of representation to satisfy self-determination 
that it cannot satisfy.  Thus, a consent-based process is highly 
unlikely to produce a required standard of representation. 
Moreover, there may not be one international standard by 
which to judge whether a State is representative of its people.  It 
may be difficult for those outside of a State to judge the fit between 
a government and its people because they do not have the same 
experiences as those within the State.211  
Brad Roth argues, for example, that the people of a State may 
opt for an illiberal form of government out of a preference for 
unity, stability, decisive leadership, and better long-term planning 
free from the pressures of electoral politics.212  Without opining 
here on whether this claim has merit, arguments of this sort 
demonstrate the difficulty one faces in asserting States are 
illegitimate representatives of their own people based on a failure 
to provide civil and political rights.  A more extreme repudiation 
of the government appears required.213   
Because human rights law cannot distinguish between 
representative and unrepresentative States, except at the margins, 
limiting restrictions on consent to unrepresentative States is 
infeasible.  Instead, any restrictions on consent will draw in both 
representative and unrepresentative States.  And, as a 
consequence, such restrictions will burden the self-determination 
of those in representative States. 
Consider, for example, the decision by TMB and human rights 
courts to employ a teleological approach to treaty interpretation.214  
Such an approach prioritizes the purpose of protecting human 
rights as understood by the TMB or court over indicia of State 
consent.  Assuming the government of North Korea does not 
represent its people, departing from the consent of the North 
Korean government does not appear to implicate self-
determination.  But the teleological interpretative approach is not 
                                                     
211 Walzer, supra note 148, at 212. 
212 BRAD R. ROTH, GOVERNMENTAL ILLEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 27–28 
(1999).  
213 Id. at 419; Walzer, supra note 148, at 214. 
214 See supra Section 2.3.2 (discussing treaty interpretation practices by TMB 
and human rights courts). 
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limited to locating obligations of unrepresentative States.  Sweden 
too would be constrained by the TMB or court treaty 
interpretation.  And departures from the consent of Sweden would 
impinge on the self-determination of the Swedish people. 
Second, the departures from the consent principle described in 
Part 1 do not transfer decision making on rights questions to 
institutions or individuals that are any more representative of 
unrepresented peoples than their dysfunctional States.  In 
customary law, the Nicaragua rule diminishes the ability of any 
particular State to dissent from a putative custom through contrary 
behavior.215  Thus, a State like North Korea, which does not 
represent its people, cannot block the formation of human rights 
law through its contrary practice without verbal repudiation of the 
underlying right. 
But this outcome does not give the otherwise disenfranchised 
North Korean people any voice in formation of human rights 
customs.  Rather, it merely shifts decision-making authority from 
one unrepresentative institution (the government of North Korea) 
to other institutions that do not represent the Korean people, other 
States.  Other departures from the consent principle transfer 
similar authority from unrepresentative States to TMB, human 
rights courts, and even activist groups and scholars. 
This discussion suggests that, while improving the 
representation States afford their people is critical to satisfying the 
promise of self-determination, restricting the consent principle is 
no solution.  It does not provide disenfranchised peoples any 
greater say in the content of human rights law.  And it does restrict 
the self-determination of those living within effectively 
representative States. 
4. CONSEQUENCES 
Part 2 establishes a human rights dimension to consent not 
accounted for in the traditional State sovereignty based account of 
the concept.  Consent is essential to the protection of the collective 
right to self-determination.  This link means that efforts to reorient 
the international system toward the protection of human rights 
should value consent for the benefits it provides human rights.  
                                                     
215 See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing the ICJ’s holding in 
the Nicaragua Case). 
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Such an approach has not been taken because the relationship 
between consent and self-determination has gone largely 
unnoticed.216  This Part re-imagines the consent principle as one 
rooted in human rights law and explores the consequences for 
human rights lawmaking. 
The most important insight provided in this Article is that 
consent is a normative positive for the protection of human rights.  
A valuable part of the human experience is the ability to 
participate in a community with control over its development.  
This requires control over international human rights obligations.  
In exercising this control, peoples may opt for amorphous and 
indefinite obligations to allow discretion in implementation on the 
local level.  They may also opt out of particular human rights 
obligations entirely.  Such outcomes are not per se negative to the 
protection of human rights, but rather may reflect the successful 
execution of self-determination. 
This human rights value suggests tools like the margin of 
appreciation, which grants States deference to their interpretation 
of their rights obligations, has a stronger foundation in human 
rights law than previously imagined.217  States should be given a 
degree of freedom to make their own choices about how to best 
comply with human rights obligations because of the impact those 
obligations have on social development.  Critics of the ECtHR’s use 
of the margin of appreciation in its jurisprudence218 take an unduly 
                                                     
216 Scholars do sometimes note in passing that departing from the consent 
principle is problematic from a democracy or self-determination perspective, but 
rarely linger upon this point.  See MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, WHOSE UNIVERSAL VALUES? 
THE CRISIS IN HUMAN RIGHTS 21–23 (1999) (arguing that allowing human rights to 
override State consent automatically undermines the human right of self-
determination); Goldsmith, supra note 124, at 333 (describing democratic 
legitimacy concerns in relying on academics and human rights activists to 
determine the content of law); Oona A. Hathaway, International Delegation and 
State Sovereignty, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 115, 146 (2008) (noting that an overly 
expansive understanding of core human rights norms can threaten self-
determination and autonomy); Helfer, supra note 138, at 78 (stating the challenge 
to democracy posed by international delegation increases with nonconsensual 
lawmaking).  
217 See Case “Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of 
Languages in Education in Belgium,” 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20–21 (1968) 
(providing rationale for use of the margin of appreciation, translated here as 
“margin of discretion”).  The margin of appreciation, however, reserves for the 
Court final say on interpretation of the treaty. 
218 See Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal 
Standards, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 843, 852 (1999) (locating tension between the 
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cramped view of human rights.  Granting communities the ability 
to make choices about how to organize society, rather than being a 
concession to power politics or outdated conceptions of 
sovereignty, permits people to exercise control over the contours of 
their community, a value intrinsic to the human experience. 
But like most human rights, self-determination is not 
absolute.219  Most human rights balanced when in conflict with 
competing rights, which argues in favor of recognizing limitations 
to the consent principle where supported by a proper, 
proportionate human rights justification.220  Such an approach 
revolutionizes the way human rights law thinks about consent.  As 
a manifestation of State sovereignty, consent must be absolute, or 
near absolute, to ensure States’ rights are vindicated.  By contrast, 
                                                     
margin of appreciation and the goal of protecting human rights); Jeffrey A. 
Brauch, The Dangerous Search for an Elusive Consensus: What the Supreme Court 
Should Learn from the European Court of Human Rights, 52 HOW. L.J. 277 (2009) 
(arguing that the scope of human rights should not be determined using societal 
consensus because it is unworkable, and “endangers both human rights and the 
rule of law”). 
219 Peremptory norms are the one exception, as they void competing norms 
located in treaties, are not subject to derogation or limitation, and may be 
modified only by another norm of the same character.  VCLT, supra note 19, at art. 
53. 
220 Provisions mandating balancing between competing interests are 
expressly included in multilateral human rights instruments.  See, e.g., ECHR, 
supra note 85, at art. 9 (balancing freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
against the needs of a democratic society to protect “public safety,” “public order, 
health or morals,” and “the rights and freedoms of others”); ICCPR, supra note 12, 
at art. 18 (allowing State restriction of freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
where “prescribed by law” and “necessary to protect public safety, order, health, 
or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others”); ICESCR, supra note 
12, at art. 2 (“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, 
individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially 
economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to 
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of 
legislative measures.”).  They are also located in newer national constitutions.  See 
S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 27 (requiring a State to take measures to provide health care 
services, food, water and social security “within its available resources”); INDIA 
CONST. art. 41 (limiting right to work, education and public assistance to India’s 
“economic capacity and development”).  
  Even in the United States, where rights provisions do not include any 
express balancing requirements, balancing tests have been employed.  See, e.g., 
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490–91 (1976) (limiting application of the 
Exclusionary Rule to Fourth Amendment violations where the costs of application 
were disproportionate to the benefit). 
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as a human rights value, consent is subject to limitation in order to 
accommodate competing rights.221 
 Proportionality analysis is missing with respect to self-
determination today.  Insufficient attention has been paid to what 
sorts of human rights justifications support restricting self-
determination, and whether departures from the consent principle 
are proportionate to such goals. 
Conventional theory identifies two important situations in 
which departures from the consent principle are countenanced.  
First, traditional international lawmaking mandates States behave 
as States have customarily behaved, even where the outcome is 
arguably nonconsensual.  Second, peremptory norms are binding 
on all States, including those who persistently object.  In State 
sovereignty terms, such departures from the consent principle 
have been difficult to justify.222 
But, in human rights terms, such departures from the consent 
principle are easier to understand.  International law recognizes 
the right of the international community of States to set community 
obligations, which individual States are expected to follow.223  The 
peoples of States have the right to self-direct development only 
within bounds set by the consensus of the international community 
of States.  Thus, to the extent international human rights law 
evolves to restrict the ability of individual States to dissent from 
genuine consensus within the international community on the 
content of rights, then there is an established human rights 
justification for doing so. 
At least two of the legal developments described in Part 1.3. fall 
into this category.  In treaty law, the HRC claims it has the 
authority to determine whether State reservations are consistent 
                                                     
221 If consent is not present then there must be an alternative constitutive 
basis for the right in question.  The fact that States customarily behave 
consistently with the right is one such accepted basis.  Another basis is the sense 
among the community of States that the norm is peremptory and not subject to 
dissent.  And, as I argue in forthcoming scholarship, still another constitutive 
basis for human rights law is the moral obligations of States.  Vijay M. 
Padmanabhan, Separation Anxiety: The Case for Inclusive Positivism in International 
Human Rights Law, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. (forthcoming May 2014). 
222 See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 178–
79 (1986) (arguing that State sovereignty mandates that States be permitted to 
persistently object even to jus cogens norms). 
223 See Henkin, supra note 72, at 43–44 (stating human rights law is akin to 
international constitutional law, which trumps competing national laws). 
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with the object and purpose of the Covenant.  Where they are not, 
the Committee severs the reservation and holds the State to the 
original provision.224  The HRC also claims that a State may not exit 
from the ICCPR once it becomes party to the Convention.225  Thus, 
in totality, the HRC claims the authority to sever invalid 
reservations and hold the State to the original obligation without 
granting the State the opportunity to exit from the treaty.  Such an 
approach would result in the HRC holding States to rights 
standards to which they never agreed,226 which is a severe 
restriction of self-determination. 
One way to recast the HRC’s views on reservations is that they 
seek to pressure individual States to conform to a community 
norm, which is in this case represented by the treaty standard in 
question.  Agreements like the ICCPR were negotiated by nearly 
all of the world’s States in existence at the time of negotiation, and 
today have been ratified by most.  As a consequence, the standards 
within represent a human rights version of community norms, the 
enforcement of which is an accepted justification for restricting 
self-determination. 
Consider, for example, the U.S. reservation to Article 6(5) of the 
ICCPR, which prohibits the juvenile death penalty.  The U.S. 
reservation, made when the juvenile death penalty was still lawful 
in the United States,227 excludes application of Article 6(5) in 
situations where juveniles are tried as adults, and therefore eligible 
for the death penalty.228  The HRC has written that this reservation 
                                                     
224 See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text (showing how the HRC 
took this approach with Trinidad and Tobago’s reservation denying the HRC 
jurisdiction over petitions by death row prisoners). 
225 See U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 26 (61), supra note 
117, ¶ 5 (“The Committee is therefore firmly of the view that international law 
does not permit a State which has ratified or acceded or succeeded to the 
Covenant to denounce it or withdraw from it.”). 
226 See Helfer, supra note 138, at 77 (viewing the HRC approach to severance 
of reservations as an example of nonconsensual lawmaking). 
227 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (overturning earlier cases 
and holding that the Eighth Amendment forbids execution of minors).  
228 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. TREATY 
COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/ 
Chapter%20IV/IV-4.en.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2013) (providing a full record of 
all U.S. reservations to the ICCPR). 
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is inconsistent with the object and purpose of the Covenant.229  
Pursuant to the Committee’s view of reservations, the United 
States is bound not to execute juveniles as a matter of treaty law, 
despite its specific desire not to undertake such an obligation.  This 
approach incurs a significant human rights cost for the American 
people.  Their collective right to self-determination includes an 
apparent entitlement to decide whether to use the juvenile death 
penalty to combat crime. 
But the HRC acts upon a legitimate human rights justification 
when it seeks to remove the juvenile death penalty from the remit 
of self-determination.  The international community of States views 
the prohibition on the juvenile death penalty as a community 
obligation.  The prohibition on the juvenile death penalty has been 
accepted as an international legal obligation by all States except the 
United States and Somalia through membership in the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child.230  The need for outlier States like the 
United States to conform to international community expectations 
on human rights questions is an accepted justification for 
restricting self-determination. 
The same justification sometimes supports the ICJ decision in 
the Nicaragua case.  The ICJ concluded that contrary State practice 
does not count against the existence of a custom if that behavior is 
defended consistently with the putative custom.  As discussed, this 
approach restricts the ability of States to dissent from customs 
through contrary behavior alone, a restriction on self-
determination.  But, where the custom in question is already well 
established, such a rule pressures outlier States to fulfill 
community obligations. 
This analysis provides a new justification for Bruno Simma’s 
argument that the Nicaragua rule is more justifiable in situations 
where there is a clear custom already in place, as opposed to where 
                                                     
229 Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., ¶ 279, U.N. Doc. A/50/40; GAOR, 50th 
Sess., Supp. No. 40, (1995) (stating that the Committee finds the United States’s 
reservations regrettable and incompatible with the “object and purpose of the 
Covenant”). 
230 See Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 37(a), Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 
U.N.T.S. 3 (“No child shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.  Neither capital punishment nor life 
imprisonment without possibility of release shall be imposed . . . .”). 
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one is searching to determine whether a new custom has formed.231  
If in fact traditional practice demonstrates the existence of a 
community norm prohibiting particular conduct, then imposing 
self-determination costs can be justified by the need to enforce 
community norms. 
By contrast, if no such international consensus is evident, some 
other justification must exist for the restriction on self-
determination.  Often a putative custom, like the duty to prosecute 
described in Part 1, lacks evidence that it is well established as a 
community obligation within the international community of 
States.  In such cases work must be done to identify other human 
rights justifications for infringing upon self-determination.   
The Nicaragua rule is not alone in restricting consent in 
circumstances where vindicating a community obligation is not at 
stake.  Traditionally jus cogens norms eliminate a State’s ability to 
dissent only where there is general acceptance of the international 
community that the conduct prohibited by the norm is outside 
permissible bounds of State conduct.232  But, as described in Part 
1.3. there are scholars and activists who have advocated for 
recognizing still more peremptory norms, even in the absence of 
universal or near universal agreement.  Such restrictions must be 
supported by a human rights justification other than enforcement 
of community norms. 
Similarly, as discussed in Part 1, TMB frequently depart from 
the consent of States as their touchstone in interpreting treaty 
obligations.  When they do so, the interpretation that they proffer 
often does not reflect any sort of consensus view within the 
international community of States on the content of human rights 
law. 
For example, the Women’s Committee has pushed forward in 
interpreting CEDAW to protect some abortion rights.233  It did so 
                                                     
231 See Simma, supra note 39, at 220 (arguing that the Nicaragua rule is sensible 
in some but not all situations). 
232 VCLT, supra note 19, at art. 53.  See also Hathaway, supra note 216, at 147 
(accepting restrictions on the right of an individual State to reject “limits on 
government action that are shared by nearly every culture and religion, at least in 
aspiration, if not always in reality”); Henkin, supra note 72, at 44 (“[A]n occasional 
state cannot veto law that reflects the contemporary international political-moral 
intuition.”). 
233 See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text (analyzing the Women’s 
Committee’s General Recommendation 24).  
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despite the absence of global consensus that laws criminalizing 
abortion violate a community obligation; indeed, the continued 
prevalence of criminal restrictions on abortion suggests that no 
such consensus exists.  Such restrictions must be supported by a 
human rights justification other than pushing outlier States to 
accept community obligations. 
There are at least three potential new justifications for 
restricting self-determination that are worth considering.  First, 
where there is an accepted community norm, restrictions on self-
determination may be required for States to accept secondary 
obligations necessary to effectuate the accepted norm.  Scholars 
have argued that the duty to prosecute serious violations of 
international law is peremptory despite the absence of 
international consensus on the existence of a duty because the 
crimes being prosecuted are themselves peremptory.234  TMB and 
human rights courts have found that the prohibition on torture and 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment includes an implicit, 
absolute non-refoulement obligation because the prohibition on 
torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment is absolute.235 
But caution is needed because the justification for the 
secondary norm may not support the same restriction on self-
determination that does the primary norm.  For example, the 
differences in the nature of the duty not to commit torture and to 
protect against torture by third parties argue in favor of greater 
self-determination restrictions in the case of the former compared 
to the latter.236  It is critical to parse the specific reasons for 
                                                     
234 See generally Bassiouni, supra note 77 (advocating for a duty to prosecute 
offenses which are forbidden in international law); Orentlicher, supra note 77 
(summarizing the development of a duty to punish within international law). 
235 See Chahal v. United Kingdom, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1835, 1855–56 
(holding the protection of torture, including extradition that will result in torture, 
is absolute regardless of the undesirability of the individual at issue); U.N. 
Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31 [80], supra note 103, ¶ 12 (stating 
that the ICCPR “entails an obligation not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise 
remove a person from [the State’s] territory, where there are substantial grounds 
for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm . . . .”); see also David 
Jenkins, Rethinking Suresh: Refoulement to Torture Under Canada’s Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms, 47 ALTA. L. REV. 125, 151 (2009) (viewing non-refoulement as jus 
cogens). 
236 See Padmanabhan, supra note 101, at 107–12 (arguing that the duty not to 
torture and the duty to protect against torture by third parties are normatively 
different). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss1/1
PADMANABHAN_1.13 (1) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/23/2014  2:54 PM 
2013] HUMAN RIGHTS JUSTIFICATION FOR CONSENT 57 
restricting consent in situations where there is no consensus that a 
community obligation exists.  Such an inquiry has to date often not 
been undertaken because of the failure to recognize the self-
determination costs. 
Second, the need to protect minorities disfavored within the 
political processes of States may justify restrictions on self-
determination.  Western legal systems are divided on the ability of 
political institutions to protect minority rights.  If politically 
vulnerable minorities cannot exercise their voice in State 
governments, then this failure may be a sufficient justification for 
restricting self-determination on rights affecting such minorities. 
Such a justification reflects Will Kymlicka’s distinction between 
external and internal aspects of collective rights.  Kymlicka argues 
groups must be able to create barriers to prevent outsiders from 
eroding group identity.237  But he disagrees with efforts to use 
group status to force dissenting members of the group to act 
consistently with group norms.238  Protecting dissenters may 
require overriding the decisions of the group. 
The difficulty, of course, is how to identify which norms 
protecting minorities require a departure from the consent 
principle.  So-called minority rights, such as gay rights, women’s 
rights, and rights of religious minorities, also go directly to the 
heart of the kind of society and culture a people wish to maintain.  
Removing such choices from the scope of self-determination would 
be an intense burden on self-determination. 
Third, humans may possess moral rights, or rights States ought 
to provide, separate and apart from legal rights.  The moral 
imperative to protect moral rights through legal obligation may 
justify departures from the consent principle.  The concept of 
universal human rights posits that humans qua humans enjoy 
entitlements regardless of the State where they live.  It is for this 
reason that human rights are described as “universal” in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  Moral rights represent a 
potential natural limit to self-determination, as peoples have no 
right to use their respective States to develop in a manner that 
transgresses the moral rights of a portion of its population. 
                                                     
237 KYMLICKA, supra note 146, at 35–37. 
238 Id. at 37. 
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The problem with moral rights is determining their content.  
There is no accepted methodology to be used to determine the 
moral obligations of States.  While there may be acknowledgment 
that “ought” restricts the scope of self-determination, its 
application to concrete restrictions on self-determination will 
surely be contested.  Claims that moral rights restrict self-
determination must be carefully evaluated given the human rights 
cost associated with the claims.  
Even with a human rights justification, restrictions on self-
determination must be proportionate to the justification proffered.  
To that end, the restrictions to the consent principle described in 
Part 1.3. vary greatly in intensity.  The more severe the restriction 
on self-determination, the stronger the human rights justification 
required to support the restriction. 
The most severe restrictions on self-determination occur where 
the ability of the State to decide whether to undertake a human 
rights obligation is most constricted.  Human rights courts, like the 
ECtHR, are empowered to issue binding treaty interpretations, and 
can mandate State compliance.  States have arguably delegated to 
these courts authority to make law to fill in gaps within the treaty 
regime.239  But such courts may exercise such authority in a manner 
that creates obligations that mandate nonconsensual State action, 
creating a significant challenge to self-determination. 
Many of the practices described in Part 2.3. have a similar 
effect.  Efforts to label new norms peremptory seek to fully remove 
State control over the rights question that is the subject of the 
peremptory obligation, eliminating even the possibility of 
persistent objection.  So too does the HRC approach on 
reservations, which attempts to bind States to obligations as 
written in the ICCPR even where the State has not agreed to that 
obligation, which results in a nonconsensual treaty obligation.240  
Severely restricting State control over its human rights obligations 
requires the most robust human rights justification. 
By contrast, TMB, which are not empowered to issue binding 
interpretations of their respective treaties, can at most impose 
reputational costs on States for their failure to abide by the 
                                                     
239 Simma, supra note 107, at 497. 
240 See supra notes 113–16 and accompanying text (discussing HRC General 
Comment 24 and its application to the case of Trinidad and Tobago’s reservation 
about death row inmates).   
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interpretations.241  While these costs are impingements on the 
consent principle, States retain the option of non-compliance or 
treaty exit if they do not wish to comply.  These opt-outs reduce 
the extent to which self-determination is hindered.  And as a 
consequence these restrictions on the consent principle may be 
supported by lesser human rights justifications. 
5. CONCLUSION 
An international legal system oriented toward the protection of 
human rights should still care about State consent.  Too often, 
existing debate cabins the reasons one should care about consent to 
concerns about sovereignty, cultural relativism, or rights 
implementation.  But such a limited remit for consent is based 
upon a failure of imagination with respect to the role of the State in 
the protection of human rights. 
The collective right to self-determination envisions the people 
of a State as its sovereign.  The people use their State to make 
decisions about how to shape society for a community interested in 
a common life.  The consent principle gives the people of the State 
decision making authority over international human rights 
standards; whether to accept international supervision of 
commitments; and the pace of rights development.  Without such 
control self-determination is a far less important right.  Thus, there 
is a strong human rights justification for State consent to play an 
important role in international human rights lawmaking. 
But, as justifications for the consent principle shift to self-
determination, the contours of the principle itself must evolve.  The 
traditional consent principle, born in the era of States’ rights, fails 
to provide adequate account of the desire of the international 
community to mandate obligatory community norms.  There may 
be other justifications, such as the need to protect minority rights 
or the moral rights of man, for restricting self-determination.  Thus, 
the traditional absolute consent principle is obsolete when applied 
to human rights law. 
Restrictions on the consent principle must be proportionate to 
the justification proffered.  Proportionality analysis has not been 
                                                     
241 See supra notes 80–82 and accompanying text (summarizing the role of 
limited authority of TMB). 
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applied consistently in human rights practice and should be 
applied going forward. 
Re-imagining consent in this manner is difficult.  But, as 
Michael Reisman argued in general terms more than twenty years 
ago, it is essential if we are to reconfigure the international legal 
system around the protection of human rights.  
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